Supreme Court has already Clarified that it will not Encourage Prostitution

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Law Resoursce India New Delhi 04/11/2014

In view of the order dated 26 July 2012 in Criminal Appeal 135/2010Budhadev Karmaskar vs State of West Bengal & Ors the present debate and controversy stirred up by the NCW Chairperson Lalita Kumarmanglam on Legalization of sex trade is a contempt of Supreme Court Orders. The National Commission of Women has been a party to the case and are aware of the Bench clarification dated 26 July 2012.

Speaking to the Times Of India she said that “I will only speak about the issue after the national consultation on November 8,” . “It is my personal and professional view that sex work should be legalized but the commission must make an informed decision and I am open to listening to all views. I will be using a lot of time next week to hold informal consultations on the issue, talking to all advocacy groups and others to understand what their apprehensions are.”

On October 28, Kumaramangalam told a daily that legalization will bring down trafficking of women and lower the incidence of HIV and other sexually-transmitted diseases. She also said she intends to put forth the proposal at the November 8 meet of the SC appointed Panel.

Bharti Dey of Durbar Mahila which supports the Legalisation Debate has stated “Police very often get paid to let off traffickers. Regulation will decriminalize the trade,” says Dey, whose organization currently runs self-regulation units and has sent at least eight traffickers to jail. She also points out that many of those entering the profession are extremely poor, have few options and know what they are getting into. “But they make it to our communities through traffickers and middlemen. Legalizing will remove these middlemen,” she says.

Supreme Court Lawyer and President of Shakti Vahini Ravi Kant while opposing the statement of the NCW Chairperson statement stated “Prostitution is Organised Crime and Violation of Fundamental Rights. Trafficking and sexual slavery is worst form of Human Rights Violation. No women joins this inhuman trade out of choice. More then 95% of the women have been trafficked and forced into the sex trade”.

rtr26efdHe further elaborated that ” Immoral Traffic Prevention Act 1956 criminalises the organised crime of Prostitution. Organised Prostitution creates a demand for young girls for the brothels which is met by trafficking of minor girls from across the Country.Giving Prostituion a legal status will be giving boost to demand of young minor girls who will be trafficked. In countries where such legalization has happened it has led to exploitation of women and girls and also commodification of women bodies.

He added that there here is no doubt that women who have been caught in the sex trade  need access to all Government facilities and schemes and efforts must be made to see that they join the mainstream and are properly rehabilitated. Also those who indulge in this organised crime of human trafficking which leads to kidnapping of young girls from across the country need to be properly punished.

On the role of the Governmental agencies he lamented “The sad part is that inspite of various recommendations from the Supreme Court in various cases no geniune efforts have been made by any Government to see that this social malice which results from Organised Crime be eradicated”.

Kant further stated “The statement of the National Commission for Women Chairperson for legalising prostitution is deplorable. It is time that the Government of India ammends the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act and brings in harsher punishments to the people who are involved in this organised crime”.

The Supreme Court in its order dated 26 July 2012  has clarified that its endeavor to provide right to life and access to governmental schemes should not be construed as an encouragement to prostitution. The clarification had come from a bench of Justices Altamas Kabir and Gyan Sudha Mishra after additional solicitor general P P Malhotra had drawn the court’s attention to its July 19 order in which it had sought suggestions from the SC-constituted panel on creating “conditions conducive for sex workers who wish to continue working as sex workers with dignity”.

Malhotra had said there was a danger of the order being construed as an incentive to indulge in an activity that had been termed as an offence under the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956.

POLICE BUSTING AN INTERNATIONAL RACKET

POLICE BUSTING AN INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING RACKET

The Judges on the bench passed had passed separate orders, but both meant to clarify that the panel would recommend steps to create “conditions conducive for sex workers to live with dignity as per provisions of the Constitution Article 21”. 

Justice Kabir added a precautionary clarification — “The above modification should not be construed to mean any attempt made to encourage prostitution.”

Hearing the Petition  Justice Mishra had clarified, “I prefer to add…sex workers have a right to live with dignity but the collective endeavour must be on part of the sex workers to give up the trade in case they are given alternate platform.”

The Detailed Order of the Bench  Dated 26 /07/2012 is as follows :

1. CRLMP.NO.12415 of 2012, has been filed on behalf of the Union of India, for modification of the order passed by this Court on 19th July, 2011, referring certain issues to the Committee which had been constituted by the said order itself.

2. The first modification sought by the Union of India is for deletion of the Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Samiti, from the panel. The second modification sought is with regard to the third term of reference, which reads as follows:-

(3) Conditions conducive for sex workers who wish to continue working as sex workers with dignity.

3. Appearing in support of the application, the learned ASG, Mr. P.P. Malhotra, submitted that the Samiti in question had been actively advocating the revocation of the Immoral Traffic(Prevention) Act, 1956, and had also been advocating the recognition of sex trade being continued by sex workers. The learned ASG submitted that the continuance of such Samiti in the panel is giving a wrong impression to the public that the Union of India was also inclined to think on similar lines. The learned ASG submitted that this wrong impression should be removed by excluding the Samiti from the panel.

4. As far as the second issue is concerned, the learned ASG submitted that wording of such reference could be suitably modified so as not to give an impression that the Union of India was in favour of encouraging the sex workers, in contravention of the provisions of the aforesaid Act.

5. We have heard Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned senior advocate and Chairman of the Committee, as also learned senior advocate, Mr. Jayant Bhushan, who is also a member of the Committee and its co- Chairman and Mr. Grover, learned senior advocate, on the issue.

6. It has been submitted by Mr. Ghosh that at the meetings of the Committee, the members of the Samiti had contributed a great deal towards the understanding of the problems of the sex workers and it was not as if the said Samiti was encouraging sex trade, but were providing valuable inputs into the problems being faced by people engaged in the trade. Mr. Ghosh, Mr. Grover, and Mr. Bhushan, in one voice urged that the presence of the Samiti in the Committee was necessary even to function as a sounding board in respect of the problems that are faced by this marginalised and unfortunate section of society.

7. We agree with the submissions made by Mr. Ghosh, Mr. Grover and Mr. Bhushan, learned senior counsel, and are not, therefore, inclined to delete the Samiti from the Committee, as prayed for by the Union of India, and such prayer is rejected.

8. As to the second issue, it will not in any way make any difference to the terms of reference, if the wording of the third term of reference, is modified to the following effect:-

“Conditions conducive for sex workers to live with dignity in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution.”

9. The above modification, should not, however, be construed to mean that by this order, any attempt is being made to encourage prostitution in any way.

10. CRLMP.NO.12415 of 2012, is, therefore, disposed of in term of the aforesaid order.

11. Let this matter now be listed for consideration of the Sixth and Seventh Interim Reports, filed by the Committee, on 22nd August, 2012, at 3.00 p.m.

12. Let this Bench be reconstituted on the said date and time for the aforesaid purpose.

.………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR) NEW DELHI; JULY 26, 2012.

ORDER

1. While concurring with the views of my learned brother Justice Altamas Kabir, I prefer to add in regard to the second issue that this Court should not be misunderstood to encourage the practice of flesh trade or advocate the recognition of sex trade merely because it has raised the issue to emphasize the rehabilitation aspect of the sex workers, for which this Court had taken the initiative right at the threshold. I consider this essential in order to allay any apprehension which prompted the Union of India to move this application for modification, by highlighting that the sex workers although have a right to live with dignity as the society is aware that they are forced to continue with this trade under compulsions since they have no alternative source of livelihood, collective endeavour should be there on the part of the Court and all concerned who have joined this cause as also the sex workers themselves to give up this heinous profession of flesh trade by providing the destitute and physically abused women an alternative forum for employment and resettlement in order to be able to rehabilitate themselves. I, therefore, wish to reiterate by way of abundant caution that this Court should not be perceived to advocate the recognition of sex trade or promote the cause of prostitution in any form and manner even when it had stated earlier in its terms of reference regarding conditions conducive for sex workers who wish to continue working as sex workers with dignity.

2. Thus, when we modify the earlier term of reference and state regarding conditions conducive for sex workers to live with dignity in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, the same may not be interpreted or construed so as to create an impression or draw inference that this Court in any way is encouraging the sex workers to continue with their profession of flesh trade by providing facilities to them when it is merely making an effort to advocate the cause of offering an alternative source of employment to those sex workers who are keen for rehabilitation. When we say conditions conducive for sex workers to live with dignity, we unambiguously wish to convey that while the sex workers may be provided alternative source of employment for their rehabilitation to live life with dignity, it will have to be understood in the right perspective as we cannot direct the Union of India or the State Authorities to provide facilities to those sex workers who wish to promote their profession of sex trade for earning their livelihood, except of course the basic amenities for a dignified life, as this was certainly not the intention of this Court even when the term of reference was framed earlier.

3. We, therefore, wish to be understood that we confine ourselves to the efforts for rehabilitation of sex workers which should not be construed as facilitating, providing them assistance or creating conducive conditions to carry on flesh trade for expanding their business in any manner as it cannot be denied that the profession of sex trade is a slur on the dignity of women. Conditions conducive for sex workers to live with dignity in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution be therefore understood in its correct perspective as indicated above.

J (GYAN SUDHA MISRA) New Delhi, July 26, 2012
———————–

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Disturbing trends in judicial activism

JUDICIALREVIEW

JUDICIALREVIEW

T R ANDHYARUJINA IN THE HINDU

Public Interest Litigation is a good thing when it is used to enforce the rights of the disadvantaged. But it has now been diluted to interfere with the power of the government to take decisions on a range of policy matters

Judicial activism is not an easy concept to define. It means different things to different persons. Critics denounce judicial decisions as activist when they do not agree with them. Activism, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder. In India, the opening up of access to courts to the poor, indigent and disadvantaged sections of the nation through Public Interest Litigation, popularly known by its acronym PIL, is unexceptionable judicial activism. From 1979, the judiciary led by the Supreme Court in India became relevant to the nation in a manner not contemplated by the makers of the Constitution and became an active participant in the dispenser of social justice.

It is a matter of concern that over the years this original, beneficial and unexceptionable character of the Court’s activism in PIL has been largely converted into a general supervisory jurisdiction to correct actions and policies of government, public bodies and authorities. This is a type of judicial activism unparalleled in any other judiciary.

For basic rights

PIL jurisdiction began haltingly with little idea of its potential when the Supreme Court, in 1979, entertained complaints by social activists drawing the attention of the Court to the conditions of certain sections of society or institutions which were deprived of their basic rights.

In 1979, Supreme Court advocate Kapila Hingorani drew the Court’s attention to a series of articles in a newspaper exposing the plight of Bihar undertrial prisoners, most of whom had served pretrial detention more than the period they could have been imprisoned if convicted. Sunil Batra, a prisoner, wrote a letter to Justice Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court drawing his attention to torture by prison authorities and the miserable conditions of prisoners in jails. This was taken up as a petition and the Court passed orders for humane conditions in jails. In 1980, two professors of law wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper describing the barbaric conditions of detention in the Agra Protective House for Women which was made the basis of a writ petition in the Supreme Court. The exploitation of workmen at construction sites in violation of labour laws was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court by a letter. The slave-like condition of bonded labourers in quarries was brought to the attention of the Court by a social activist organisation. A journalist moved the court against the evictions of pavement dwellers of Bombay. Several cases of this type followed.

In dealing with such cases, the Court evolved a new regime of rights of citizens and obligations of the State and devised new methods for its accountability. In 1982, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, correctly stated the purpose of PIL as it originated. He emphasised that PIL “a strategic arm of the legal aid movement which is intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation.”

No longer were the Court’s clientele drawn from landlords, businessmen, corporations and affluent persons. With PIL, the common man, the disadvantaged and marginalised sections of society had also easy access to the Court with the help of social activists.

This unique judicial activism was not found in other countries and leading judges abroad such as Lord Harry Woolf of the United Kingdom and Justice Michael Kirby of Australia, applauded it.

The new intervention

However, over the years, the social action dimension of PIL has been diluted and eclipsed by another type of “public cause litigation” in courts. In this type of litigation, the court’s intervention is not sought for enforcing the rights of the disadvantaged or poor sections of the society but simply for correcting the actions or omissions of the executive or public officials or departments of government or public bodies. Examples of this type of intervention by the Court are innumerable. In the interest of preventing pollution, the Supreme Court ordered control over automobile emissions, air and noise and traffic pollution, gave orders for parking charges, wearing of helmets in cities, cleanliness in housing colonies, disposal of garbage, control of traffic in New Delhi, made compulsory the wearing of seat belts, ordered action plans to control and prevent the monkey menace in cities and towns, ordered measures to prevent accidents at unmanned railway level crossings, prevent ragging of college freshmen, for collection and storage in blood banks, and for control of loudspeakers and banning of fire crackers.

In recent orders, the Supreme Court has directed the most complex engineering of interlinking rivers in India. The Court has passed orders banning the pasting of black film on automobile windows. On its own, the Court has taken notice of Baba Ramdev being forcibly evicted from the Ramlila grounds by the Delhi Administration and censured it. The Court has ordered the exclusion of tourists in the core area of tiger reserves. All these managerial exercises by the Court are hung on the dubious jurisdictional peg of enforcing fundamental rights under Article 32 of the Constitution. In reality, no fundamental rights of individuals or any legal issues are at all involved in such cases. The Court is only moved for better governance and administration, which does not involve the exercise of any proper judicial function.

In its most activist and controversial interpretation of the Constitution, the Supreme Court took away the constitutionally conferred power of the President of India to appoint judges after consultation with the Chief Justice, and appropriated this power in the Chief Justice of India and a collegium of four judges. In no Constitution in the world is the power to select and appoint judges conferred on the judges themselves.

The Court is made the monitor of the conduct of investigating and prosecution agencies who are perceived to have failed or neglected to investigate and prosecute ministers and officials of government. Cases of this type are the investigation and prosecution of ministers and officials believed to be involved in the Jain Hawala case, the fodder scam involving the former Chief Minister of Bihar, Lalu Prasad Yadav, the Taj Corridor case involving the former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati, and the recent prosecution of the Telecom Minister and officials in the 2G Telecom scam case by the Supreme Court.

Military operation

The Supreme Court has made an order even in a military operation. In 1993, the Court issued orders on the conduct of military operations in Hazratbal, Kashmir where the military had as a matter of strategy restricted the food supplies to hostages. The Court ordered that the provision of food of 1,200 calorific value should be supplied to hostages. Commenting on this, an Army General wrote: “For the first time in history, a Court of Law was asked to pronounce judgment on the conduct of an ongoing military operation. Its verdict materially affected the course of operation.”

Even proceedings of Legislatures are controlled by the Court. In the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly case, the Supreme Court ordered the Assembly to conduct a Motion of Confidence and ordered the Speaker to conduct proceedings according to a prescribed agenda and not to entertain any other business. Its proceedings were ordered to be recorded for reporting to the Court. These orders were made in spite of Article 212 of the Constitution which states that Courts are not to inquire into any proceedings of the legislature.

Other examples

Matters of policy of government are subject to the Court’s scrutiny. Distribution of food-grains to persons below poverty line was monitored, which even made the Prime Minister remind the Court that it was interfering with the complex food distribution policies of government. In the 2G Licenses case, the Court held that all public resources and assets are a matter of public trust and they can only be disposed of in a transparent manner by a public auction to the highest bidder. This has led to the President making a Reference to the Court for the Court’s legal advice under Article 143 of the Constitution. In the same case, the Court set aside the expert opinion of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to sell 2G spectrum without auction to create greater teledensity in India.

The Court has for all practical purposes disregarded the separation of powers under the Constitution, and assumed a general supervisory function over other branches of governments. The temptation to rush to the Supreme Court and 21 High Courts for any grievance against a public authority has also deflected the primary responsibility of citizens themselves in a representative self government of making legislators and the executive responsible for their actions. The answer often given by the judiciary to this type of overreach is that it is compelled to take upon this task as the other branches of government have failed in their obligations. On this specious justification, the political branches of government may, by the same logic, take over the functions of the judiciary when it has failed, and there can be no doubt that there are many areas where the judiciary has failed to meet the expectations of the public by its inefficiency and areas of cases.

Justice Jackson of the U.S. has aptly said: “The doctrine of judicial activism which justifies easy and constant readiness to set aside decisions of other branches of Government is wholly incompatible with a faith in democracy and in so far it encourages a belief that judges should be left to correct the result of public indifference it is a vicious teaching.” Unless the parameters of PIL are strictly formulated by the Supreme Court and strictly observed, PIL which is so necessary in India, is in danger of becoming diffuse, unprincipled, encroaching into the functions of other branches of government and ineffective by its indiscriminate use.

(The writer is a senior advocate of the Supreme Court and former Solicitor General of India. This article is an abridged version of a lecture he recently delivered at the sesquicentennial of the Bombay High Court.)

We are not encouraging sex workers, SC clarifies

JUSTICE REVIEW

JUSTICE REVIEW

NATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH DESK

The Supreme Court today modified one of its order on welfare and rehabilitation of sex workers on the Centre’s submissions that the last year’s order gave an impression that it seeks to legalise prostitution. Allaying the Centre’s fears that it was giving its seal of approval to prostitution, a special bench of justices Altamas Kabir and Gyan Sudha Misra modified its earlier order, saying “the modification shall not be construed that by this order any encouragement is being given to prostitution.”

Modifying its earlier order, the bench clarified that it would only examine the “conditions conducive for sex workers to work with dignity in accordance with provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution.”

It added it was keen that sex workers should be given opportunity to avail rehabilitation measures of the government and other agencies for them. While adjudicating a petition for rehabilitation of former sex workers, the apex court had on July 19, 2011 framed three terms of reference. Appointing a broad-based panel to look into the matter, the apex court by its July 2011 order had formulated three questions related to prevention of trafficking, rehabilitation of sex workers who wish to leave the sex work and “conditions conducive for sex workers who wish to continue working as sex workers with dignity.”

On the Centre’s submission that the third term gave an impression that prostitution has been sought to be legalised, the apex court modified it to read as “conducive for sex workers to live with dignity in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution.

“The above modification shall not be construed that by this order any encouragement is being given to prostitution,” the bench added. Justice Sudha also observed, “While we do not wish to encourage sex trade we would emphasise rehabilitation of sex workers for which we had taken the issue. “We wish to add although the sex workers have right to live with dignity. There has to be collective endeavours by courts and sex workers to give up flesh trade in case they are given alternative platform on employment.”

Fixing time limit for speedy trial will prove harmful: SC

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

DHANANJAY MAHAPATRA IN THE TIMES OF INDIA

NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court may have declared in numerous judgments that speedy trial was intrinsic to right to life of an accused, but on Wednesday the court said it was apprehensive about fixing a time limit for completion of a criminal trial as it could be misused by intelligent criminals.

This comment came from a bench of Justices H L Dattu and C K Prasad during the hearing on a petition by advocate Ranjan Dwivedi, who has sought quashing of the trial proceedings against him in the L N Mishra murder case on the ground of inordinate delay saying the 37-year-long trial has blighted him personally, physically and socially.

Senior advocate T R Andhyarujina said Dwivedi was 27-year-old when the bomb blast at Samastipur railway station killed Mishra on January 2, 1975. The trial has dragged on for no fault of his, and now the accused is a frail 64-year-old. He said there was a grave danger of immense prejudice during the trial of Dwivedi as 31 of 39 defence witnesses cited by him to prove his innocence have died. As many as 22 judges have handled the trial at various stages.

“It is a unique case. The apex court has declared that right to speedy trial was a requirement under Article 21 guaranteeing right to life. But, the trial has dragged on for 37 years. In 1992, the Supreme Court had directed day-to-day trial in this case for a speedy conclusion. Two decades later, we are no where near the end,” Andhyarujina said.

“Whether the accused would get convicted or acquitted is immaterial. The question important here is whether any judicial system would tolerate such inordinate delay? Should the Supreme Court allow it to continue any more,” he added.

The bench said there was no denying that delay had been frequent in the judicial system in India. “Delay will continue to happen given the system we have. Delay definitely affects the trial but can the Supreme Court fix a time limit for completion of a criminal trial. The SC had earlier in a judgment specifically struck down fixation of a time limit for completion of trial,” it said.

“It is a unique case. But if we quash the proceedings, we may be sending a wrong signal, which may be used by an intelligent accused at a later date. We do not want this to happen because of our order,” the bench said.

The court was apprehensive that if a time limit was fixed on the trial, then an unscrupulous accused could deliberately delay the trial by challenging every order against him in higher courts and thus designed delay the trial to seek its quashing after a decade or so.

The bench said since the trial has reached the fag end after dragging for nearly four decades, it could ask the trial court to complete it in the next three months by holding proceedings on a day-to-day basis refusing adjournment on any ground to the accused and prosecution. It asked Andhyarujina and additional solicitor general Harin Raval to give their views to expeditious completion of the 37-year-long trial by Thursday.

Role of Ananda Marg was suspected in the case, and several people were arrested. The chargesheet was filed against several people, including Dwivedi. The trial was transferred to Delhi by the Supreme Court in December, 1979, after the attorney general alleged that Bihar government was interfering with the trial. Charges were framed against the accused in 1981. Dwivedi was granted bail in 1978.

Review of Rape Law

Dignity is her birthright

Dignity is her birthright

NATIONAL LAW RESEARCH DESK

The Union Cabinet today approved the proposal for introduction of the Criminal Law (Amendment ) Bill, 2012 in the Parliament.

The Law Commission of India in its 172nd Report on `Review of Rape Laws` as well the National Commission for Women have recommended for stringent punishment for the offence of rape. The High Powered Committee (HPC) constituted under the Chairmanship of Union Home Secretary examined the recommendations of Law Commission, NCW and suggestions various quarters on the subject submitted its Report along with the draft Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2011 and recommended to the Government for its enactment. The draft was further examined in consultation with the Ministry of Women and Child Development and the Ministry of Law & Justice and the draft Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2012 was prepared.

The highlights of the Bill include substituting sections 375, 376, 376A and 376B by replacing the existing sections 375, 376, 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D of the Indian Penal Code,1860, replacing the word `rape’ wherever it occurs by the words `sexual assault`, to make the offence of sexual assault gender neutral, and also widening the scope of the offence sexual assault.

The punishment for sexual assault will be for a minimum of seven years which may extend to imprisonment for life and also fine for aggravated sexual assault, i.e., by a police officer within his jurisdiction or a public servant / manager or person talking advantage of his position of authority etc. The punishment will be rigorous imprisonment which shall not be less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment and also fine.

The age of consent has been raised from 16 years to 18 years in sexual assault. However, it is proposed that the sexual intercourse by a man with own wife being under sixteen years of age is not sexual assault. Provision for enhancement of punishment under sections 354 and 509 of IPC and insertion of sections 326A and 326B in the IPC for making acid attack a specific offence have been made.

RAPE LAWS RECOMMENDATION NCW

172LAW COMMISSION REPORT ON REVIEW OF RAPE LAW

Gigantic challenge

V VENKATESAN IN THE FRONTLINE

Ranjit Kumar, the amicus curiae in the interlinking of rivers case, is a senior advocate in the Supreme Court and has been practising for nearly 32 years. He has been the amicus curiae in about 14 matters before the Supreme Court, including the ones on the cleaning of the Yamuna and the sealing of illegal commercial establishments in Delhi. In this interview to Frontline, he tries to clarify many of the concerns voiced by experts about the Supreme Court’s judgment in the interlinking of rivers case.

Critics of the judgment have pointed out that none of the 30 projects being planned has been approved or sanctioned and that none of them is ready for implementation. The delay has been attributed to the divergence of perspectives on the project between the National Democratic Alliance government and the United Progressive Alliance government which succeeded it.

I don’t want to get into the political realm of the matter. What had already been achieved was that the peninsular and the Himalayan links had been identified. There are 14 Himalayan links and 16 peninsular links. That apart, most of the rivers are inter-State rivers. After the drawing up of the pre-feasibility reports, which itself took time, there was a bar chart presented by the government as to how much time it would take. The government had given milestone timetables under which the implementation of the project would be completed by December 31, 2016.

The steps required were first, the feasibility study, then funding proposals, then the concurrence of the Chief Ministers of the States and then the completion of the detailed project reports (DPRs). And even in 2002, while the matter was going on in the court, the government informed that feasibility studies in respect of six river links had already been completed. So, I would not like to say that none of the projects is lying in limbo. The Standing Committee of Parliament for Water Resources, which has been noticed in paragraph 24 of the judgment, had asked why the project was at a nascent stage. The committee had strongly recommended going ahead with the project. That was why I sought the court’s intervention. Undoubtedly, the ILR [interlinking of rivers] programme is a gigantic challenge, and a momentous one before the Union government.

The report of the National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) appears to be the only basis for the judgment. Does this report adequately assess the gains from ILR for drought prevention and flood control?

The Union of India in all its affidavits filed in the Supreme Court always supported the programme and the NWDA [the National Water Development Agency] continued to function under the aegis of the Secretary, Water Resources. Feasibility reports and DPRs were made, or have been made in the cases of some. Therefore, to say that the NCAER 2008 report is the only basis for the judgment is not correct. The court has definitely lifted from the report’s conclusions dealing with the economic aspect and social impact and the benefits arising from the project.

The two basic premises that determined the admission of PIL in this case were that the ILR would lead to drought proofing and flood control and that there was consensus among the States. These two premises have subsequently become vulnerable.

I do not agree that they are vulnerable. Because nobody can deny that there is flooding every year and droughts every year. How much money does the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund have to expend to mitigate the devastation caused by floods and droughts? For the last 60 years, can we say that the premises of flooding and drought are vulnerable?

Critics point out that courts cannot lay down the manner in which the right to water should be ensured.

It is not the right to water which is being ensured. What is being ensured is the beneficial aspects of having 40 million hectares irrigated. And when you can have waterways systems, the yearly misery of droughts and floods can be got rid of. Chapter 2 of the NCAER report amply bears this out. It explains the benefits of river valley projects, namely, the Indira Gandhi Canal project, the Tennessee Valley project, the Colorado River Canal system and the Three Gorges dam.

The relationship between the right to water and the ILR project has been described as tenuous.

The judgment itself doesn’t say that there is a link between the right to water and the project. The court is only saying that the project is in the national interest. In paragraphs 50, 52, and 63, the court says that these are matters of national interest and national problems should be viewed with greater objectivity, rationality and spirit of service to the nation.

Does the ILR project adequately address the concerns on biodiversity and impact on the environment?

That is why environmentalists are in the task force. They have a big say in the matter. I have attended a few meetings of the task force. Most of the objections pertain to rehabilitation programmes for those being displaced. Therefore, the aspect which relates to rehabilitation will be a part of the project itself as we have seen in other places such as Tehri, and Narmada dam. I don’t agree that the project ignores the concerns on the environment and biodiversity. Even if environmentalists say so, they have to give reasons, and the court will look into the reasons. If it is successful all over the world, and specifically in China, Brazil and Pakistan, then surely it cannot be said that it will not be successful here.

Some of the projects may involve international agreements, especially between India and Bangladesh. Has the judgment taken this into account?

There are issues with Nepal and Bangladesh, which will be sorted out. This will be part of the implementation process. Whatever will be required will be done.

Has the court considered the need for clearances under the Environment Protection and Forest Conservation Acts and the National Rehabilitation Policy, and from the Planning Commission and the Cabinet?

These are all in the implementation process. Reports have to be filed. The court will consider the grounds cited by these agencies if they conclude that the project is not feasible and will dwell on it. I can file a contempt, if nothing is happening, for default or for non-compliance of the directions by the Supreme Court as mentioned in Paragraph 64 (XVI) of the judgment.

Did the UPA government make its stand clear to the court on the ILR project despite its reservations?

The government has at no stage expressed any reservation about the project. A few States may have. The Centre has never taken the stand that it is not feasible. It went along, filed status reports about what has been happening and how the matter has progressed. It did not say that it is not feasible or that we should not do it. If the government were to come to such a conclusion that it is not feasible, then it will make a somersault of its earlier position. Nobody can deny the benefits accruing from these projects.

How do you react to the criticism that the ILR can lead to fresh inter-State river disputes and that it may not solve the existing ones?

I have informed the court that in view of the provisions of the River Boards Act, 1956, enacted by Parliament, there is a declaration under Section 2 that the Central government should take under its control the regulation of inter-State rivers and river valleys. Section 13 provides for optimum utilisation of water resources and for promotion and operation of schemes of flood control. Section 15 empowers preparation of schemes to develop inter-State river or river valleys. And this has been noted in Paragraph 58 of the judgment. Therefore, if there is an existence of regulatory framework by the declaration of Parliament, there need not be any inter-State river dispute. The tribunal is not necessary. The Central government can exercise that power. The Central government never applied its mind to this Act when disputes arose and tribunals were set up. When I brought this to the notice of the court, the judges found a way to deal with the matter.

It is pointed out that the Supreme Court has failed to consider the diversity of views on the reasons for India’s water crisis and that the ILR may not be the best possible answer.

This judgment does not deal with water crisis. This judgment deals with the benefits arising from interlinking and the malice or misery that is prevailing on account of droughts and floods. This judgment does not deal with the water crisis to the extent of drinking water. But it deals with an aspect that if interlinking takes place, how many million hectares of land will be irrigated.

V VENKATESAN IN THE FRONTLINE

National Legal Research Desk on Violence Against Women and Children

Supreme Court of India

NATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH DESK

The Constitution of India provides for special treatment of women, guarantees equality and prohibits discrimination. The government of India has been strengthening various laws focused on women and children. This has been more visible since the Beijing CEDAW Conference. The recent years have been witness to some landmark interpretations and directives related to Violence against Women.  Despite the constitutional mandate of equal legal status for men and women, the same is yet to be realized. The dejure laws have not been translated into defacto situation for various reasons such as illiteracy, social practices, prejudices, cultural norms based on patriarchal values, poor representation of women in policy-making, poverty, regional disparity in development, lack of access and opportunity to information and resources, etc. The ground situation more or less remains the same.

Most of the laws come with various institutional machinery, partnership between various stakeholders and active role of NGOs.  These institutions need to be in existence in order for the law to be effective. Also the policies and programmes made at the top takes a long time to percolate to the bottom and there is an urgent need of sharing information and resoursces.

 The awareness on laws and access to justice remains dismal. At the district and the state level sensitivity on women rights among judicial officers, administration and the police is very low. This leads to a situation where the implementation of the law becomes difficult.  Recently India has increased its budgetary support for the implementation of various laws on violence against women and it becomes increasingly more important for the organization like Shakti Vahini to work on governance specially related to women and children issuesThe National Legal Research Desk (NLRD) has been instituted to strengthen the implementation of the laws related to Women and Children in India. NLRD focuses on documenting the recent changes in the law, collect and compile the Recent Landmark Judgments of the Supreme Courts of India & the High Courts and ensure wide scale dissemination of the same through the government and the non government machinery. The NLRD will work with Law Enforcement Agencies, Police Academies, Judicial Agencies, Government Agencies, Statutory Agencies, NGOs, Civil Society and Mass Media on promoting Access to Justice for Women and Children. The NLRD website is a knowledge Hub for compilation of all Laws, Judgements and Resource materials on Violence against Women and Children in India. In the first phase (2012) it will focus on the laws related to Human Trafficking, Domestic Violence, Juvenile Justice, Rape Laws, PCPNDT Act , Honour Crimes and Victim Compensation.

NATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH DESK