LAW RESOURCE INDIA

Leaving a light, Justice Krishna Iyer passes away

Posted in LEGAL LUMINARIES, SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on December 4, 2014

KRISHNA_IYER_4127e

Eminent jurist and former Supreme Court judge, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, passed away at a private hospital in Kochi around 3.30 p.m. on Thursday. He died due to renal and cardiac failure, hospital sources said. He was hospitalised for a fortnight.

Justice Iyer, known for his forthright views, turned 100 recently. He was sworn in as the judge of the Supreme Court on July 17, 1973 and retired at the age of 65 on November14, 1980.Born to a leading criminal lawyer V.V. Rama Ayyar in 1915 in Thalassery, Justice Iyer had his education at the Basel Mission School, Thalassery, Victoria College, Palakkad, Annamalai University and Madras Law College. After starting legal practice in 1937 under his father in the Thalassery courts, he used to appear for workers and peasants in several agrarian struggle-related cases in his early years of practice.

He became a member of the Madras Legislative Assembly in 1952. He held portfolios such as law, justice, home, irrigation, power, prisons, social welfare and inland navigation in the first Communist government in Kerala headed by E.M.S. Namboodiripad that came to power in 1957. He was instrumental in passing several pieces of people-oriented legislations during his tenure as minister in the Communist government.

He resumed his legal practice in August 1959 and threw himself into the legal profession after he lost the 1965 Assembly election. He was appointed a judge of the Kerala High Court on July 2, 1968. He was elevated as Judge of the Supreme Court on July 17, 1973, and retired on November, 14, 1980. He served as a Member of the Law Commission from 1971 to 1973.

His landmark judgments include the Shamser Singh case which interpreted the powers of the Cabinet vis-à-vis the President, Maneka Gandhi case which gave a new dimension to Article 21, Ratlam Municipality case, and Muthamma’s case. He had pushed for reformative theory, in contrast to deterrence theory in the criminal justice system. He also received brickbats for granting conditional stay on the Allahabad High Court verdict declaring former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s election to the Lok Sabha void.

In 2002, Justice Iyer was part of the citizen’s panel that inquired into the Gujarat riots along with retired justice P.B. Sawant and others. He was conferred with Padma Vibhushan in the 1999. He had unsuccessfully contested to the post of President against Congress nominee late R. Venkitaraman in 1987. He also headed the Kerala Law Reform Commission in 2009. He has to his credit around 70 books, mostly on law, and four travelogues. Wandering in Many Worlds is his autobiography. He has also authored a book in Tamil, Neethimandramum Samanvya Manithanum.

He has been actively involved in social and political life after his retirement, almost till a few weeks when ill-health and advancing age took their toll on him. His 100th birthday was celebrated in Kochi last month and a number of programmes were organised by members of the legal fraternity, citizenry and his friends and well-wishers to felicitate him. Justice Iyer’s wife predeceased him. He is survived by two sons.

The body of Justice Iyer will be taken to the Rajiv Gandhi Indoor Stadium, Kadavanthra, on Friday, where members of the general public will be able to pay homage to the departed jurist, said M.G.Rajamanikyam, Ernakulam district collector. The funeral will take place at Ravipuram crematorium at 6 p.m. on Friday, he said.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/justice-krishna-iyer-passes-away/article6661758.ece

Tagged with: ,

How a corrupt judge continued in Madras high court

Posted in ACCOUNTABILITY, CORRUPTION, JUDICIARY, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on July 21, 2014

Image (65)PUBLISHED IN THE TIMES OF INDIA

This expose is by Justice Markandey Katju, who was chief justice of Madras high court before becoming a Supreme Court judge. He is now chairman of the Press Council of India.

There was an additional judge of the Madras high court against whom there were several allegations of corruption. He had been directly appointed as a district judge in Tamil Nadu, and during his career as district judge there were as many as eight adverse entries against him recorded by various portfolio judges of the Madras high court. But one acting chief justice of Madras high court by a single stroke of his pen deleted all those adverse entries, and consequently he became an additional judge of the high court, and he was in that post when I came as chief justice of Madras high court in November 2004.

That judge had the solid support of a very important political leader of Tamil Nadu. I was told that this was because while a district judge he had granted bail to that political leader.

Since I was getting many reports about his corruption, I requested the Chief Justice of India, Justice RC Lahoti, to get a secret IB inquiry made about him. A few weeks thereafter, while I was in Chennai, I received a call from the secretary of the CJI saying that Justice Lahoti wanted to talk to me. The CJI then came on the line and said that what I had complained about had been found true. Evidently the IB had found enough material about the judge’s corruption.

New Picture (2)Since the two-year term as additional judge of that person was coming to an end, I assumed he would be discontinued as a judge of the high court in view of the IB report. However, what actually happened was that he got another one year’s appointment as an additional judge, though six other additional judges who had been appointed with him were confirmed and made permanent judges of the high court.

I later learned how this happened. The Supreme Court collegium consists of five most senior judges for recommending names for appointment as a Supreme Court judge, and three most senior judges for dealing with high courts.

The three most senior judges in the Supreme Court at that time were the Chief Justice of India, Justice Lahoti, Justice YK Sabharwal, and Justice Ruma Pal. This Supreme Court collegium recommended that in view of the adverse IB report the judge should be discontinued as a high court judge after his two-year term was over, and this recommendation was sent to the central government.

The UPA government was at the Centre at that time. Congress was no doubt the largest party in this alliance, but it did not have a majority in Lok Sabha, and was dependent on the support of its allies. One such ally was the party in Tamil Nadu which was backing this corrupt judge. On coming to know of the recommendation of the three-judge Supreme Court collegium they strongly objected to it.

New Picture (1)The information I got was that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was at that time leaving for New York to attend the UN general assembly session. At the Delhi airport, he was told by ministers of the Tamil Nadu party that by the time he returned from New York his government would have fallen as their party would withdraw support to the UPA (for not continuing that additional judge).

On hearing this, Singh panicked, but he was told by a senior Congress minister not to worry, and that he would manage everything. That minister then went to Justice Lahoti and told him there would be a crisis if that additional judge was discontinued. On hearing this, Justice Lahoti sent a letter to the government of India to give another term of one year as additional judge to that corrupt judge, (I wonder whether he consulted his two Supreme Court collegium members ), and it was in these circumstances this corrupt judge was given another one-year term as additional judge (while his six batch mates as additional judges were confirmed as permanent Judges).

The additional judge was later given another term as additional judge by the new CJI Justice Sabharwal, and then confirmed as a permanent judge by the next CJI Justice KG Balakrishnan, but transferred to another high court.

I have related all this to show how the system actually works, whatever it is in theory. In fact, in view of the adverse IB report the judge should not even have been allowed to continue as additional judge.

 

Vodafone completes trinity of infamous SC orders: Ex-CJI Verma

Posted in SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on November 16, 2012

Supreme Court of India

MANISH CHIBBER IN THE INDIAN EXPRESS

Former chief justice of India J S Verma has termed the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Vodafone tax case as one of its three judgments “which are best forgotten or allowed to pass”.

Verma had first criticised the judgment on Saturday when he spoke at the launch of the book My Experience with the office of Additional Solicitor General of India by former ASG Bishwajit Bhattacharyya. On Thursday, speaking to The Indian Express at his Noida home, the jurist spelt out why he felt the Vodafone judgment delivered on January 20 by a bench headed by then CJI S H Kapadia deserved to be clubbed with the controversial judgments of the apex court in the habeas corpus case during the Emergency — often referred to as the lowest point in the history of Indian judiciary — and the JMM bribery case.

“At the book launch, I said I agreed with the analysis of Bishwajit Bhattacharyya as to why the judgment was incorrect on merits. But, I have some other reasons why I don’t think this judgment to be correct or appropriate in law,” Verma said. “The first reason is that, in my understanding, the three-judge judgment in Vodafone bypasses a five-judge constitution bench judgment in the McDowell matter in 1985. The McDowell judgment in substance said that in this context what you have to see is the substance of the transaction to determine the tax liability and not merely the form of the transaction. But, as far as I understand the Vodafone judgment, the court has said the opposite. They (judges) have gone by the form and not the substance. According to me that is not the correct position,” he said.

The Supreme Court, in its landmark judgment in the McDowell case, had said that behind every tax law there was “as much moral sanction as behind any other welfare legislation” and that “it is neither fair nor desirable to expect the legislature to intervene and take care of every device and scheme to avoid taxation”.

Asked about the other reasons why he was not convinced with the Vodafone judgment, Verma said, “The moral foundation is as much available to tax laws as it is to welfare legislation. It is therefore necessary that while interpreting taxation laws you have to bear that fact in mind. Also, see the implication. While the law permits legitimate avoidance of tax by tax planning, illegitimate tax avoidance by adopting a subterfuge is not permissible. This should be shunned by the courts. This is something that has been settled by most cases. McDowell settled this and is the law of the land.”

He, however, clarified that he was not suggesting that the courts couldn’t take a view different from settled law. “But, the different view can’t be treated as law if it is taken by a three-judge bench. The bench should have referred it to a larger bench. I don’t think the CJI-led bench could have bypassed or distinguished from McDowell,” Verma added.

“However, there is a much bigger reason. Judges need to be committed to constitutional philosophy and not the philosophy of the ruling party. The constitutional philosophy in this case as laid out in Articles 38 and 39. The effect of benefiting a corporate is to cast a higher tax burden on the common man and when you uphold an illegal tax avoidance, then you cast a higher tax burden on the honest tax payer. According to me the Vodafone judgment has all these implications,” the former chief justice said.

“That is why, unfortunately and sadly, Vodafone completes the trinity of infamous judgments of the SC, which, the sooner they are forgotten or overcome, the better it would be.”

Parts of hostile witness’s evidence can be used: Supreme Court

Posted in SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on May 22, 2012

NEW DELHI: Judges should not treat as totally erased the evidence tendered by a witness whom the prosecution terms as hostile during a trial, the Supreme Court has said. “It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him,” the apex court bench of Justice B.S. Chauhan and Justice Dipak Misra said Monday.

“The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof,” Justice Chauhan said.

The judges said that “the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence”.  The court said this while upholding the Allahabad High Court’s verdict by which it reversed the acquittal of Ramesh Harijan in a case of rape and causing the death of a minor child in Uttar Pradesh in 1996.

The high court by its March 23, 2007 order reversed the acquittal decision of an additional district and session judge in Basti district Feb 2, 1999. The apex court said “even if a major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is the duty of the court to separate the grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end”.

“The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one, false in all) has no application in India and the witness cannot be branded as a liar. In case this maxim is applied in all the cases it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop,” the court said. The judgment said “it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of credence, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient or unworthy of reliance, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well”.

Referring to the evidence tendered by three hostile witnesses in Harijan’s case, the apex court said: “Undoubtedly, there may be some exaggeration in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses… however, it is the duty of the court to unravel the truth under all circumstances.”

“A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense”, the apex court said, upholding the high court’s verdict setting aside the acquittal of Harijan by the trial court. In Harijan’s case, the five-year-old victim was first buried by her family under the belief that she died of paralysis. But her body was later exhumed and sexual assault and death due to shock was confirmed in a medical test.

Gigantic challenge

Posted in ENVIRONMENT, RIGHT TO LIFE, SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on April 9, 2012

V VENKATESAN IN THE FRONTLINE

Ranjit Kumar, the amicus curiae in the interlinking of rivers case, is a senior advocate in the Supreme Court and has been practising for nearly 32 years. He has been the amicus curiae in about 14 matters before the Supreme Court, including the ones on the cleaning of the Yamuna and the sealing of illegal commercial establishments in Delhi. In this interview to Frontline, he tries to clarify many of the concerns voiced by experts about the Supreme Court’s judgment in the interlinking of rivers case.

Critics of the judgment have pointed out that none of the 30 projects being planned has been approved or sanctioned and that none of them is ready for implementation. The delay has been attributed to the divergence of perspectives on the project between the National Democratic Alliance government and the United Progressive Alliance government which succeeded it.

I don’t want to get into the political realm of the matter. What had already been achieved was that the peninsular and the Himalayan links had been identified. There are 14 Himalayan links and 16 peninsular links. That apart, most of the rivers are inter-State rivers. After the drawing up of the pre-feasibility reports, which itself took time, there was a bar chart presented by the government as to how much time it would take. The government had given milestone timetables under which the implementation of the project would be completed by December 31, 2016.

The steps required were first, the feasibility study, then funding proposals, then the concurrence of the Chief Ministers of the States and then the completion of the detailed project reports (DPRs). And even in 2002, while the matter was going on in the court, the government informed that feasibility studies in respect of six river links had already been completed. So, I would not like to say that none of the projects is lying in limbo. The Standing Committee of Parliament for Water Resources, which has been noticed in paragraph 24 of the judgment, had asked why the project was at a nascent stage. The committee had strongly recommended going ahead with the project. That was why I sought the court’s intervention. Undoubtedly, the ILR [interlinking of rivers] programme is a gigantic challenge, and a momentous one before the Union government.

The report of the National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) appears to be the only basis for the judgment. Does this report adequately assess the gains from ILR for drought prevention and flood control?

The Union of India in all its affidavits filed in the Supreme Court always supported the programme and the NWDA [the National Water Development Agency] continued to function under the aegis of the Secretary, Water Resources. Feasibility reports and DPRs were made, or have been made in the cases of some. Therefore, to say that the NCAER 2008 report is the only basis for the judgment is not correct. The court has definitely lifted from the report’s conclusions dealing with the economic aspect and social impact and the benefits arising from the project.

The two basic premises that determined the admission of PIL in this case were that the ILR would lead to drought proofing and flood control and that there was consensus among the States. These two premises have subsequently become vulnerable.

I do not agree that they are vulnerable. Because nobody can deny that there is flooding every year and droughts every year. How much money does the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund have to expend to mitigate the devastation caused by floods and droughts? For the last 60 years, can we say that the premises of flooding and drought are vulnerable?

Critics point out that courts cannot lay down the manner in which the right to water should be ensured.

It is not the right to water which is being ensured. What is being ensured is the beneficial aspects of having 40 million hectares irrigated. And when you can have waterways systems, the yearly misery of droughts and floods can be got rid of. Chapter 2 of the NCAER report amply bears this out. It explains the benefits of river valley projects, namely, the Indira Gandhi Canal project, the Tennessee Valley project, the Colorado River Canal system and the Three Gorges dam.

The relationship between the right to water and the ILR project has been described as tenuous.

The judgment itself doesn’t say that there is a link between the right to water and the project. The court is only saying that the project is in the national interest. In paragraphs 50, 52, and 63, the court says that these are matters of national interest and national problems should be viewed with greater objectivity, rationality and spirit of service to the nation.

Does the ILR project adequately address the concerns on biodiversity and impact on the environment?

That is why environmentalists are in the task force. They have a big say in the matter. I have attended a few meetings of the task force. Most of the objections pertain to rehabilitation programmes for those being displaced. Therefore, the aspect which relates to rehabilitation will be a part of the project itself as we have seen in other places such as Tehri, and Narmada dam. I don’t agree that the project ignores the concerns on the environment and biodiversity. Even if environmentalists say so, they have to give reasons, and the court will look into the reasons. If it is successful all over the world, and specifically in China, Brazil and Pakistan, then surely it cannot be said that it will not be successful here.

Some of the projects may involve international agreements, especially between India and Bangladesh. Has the judgment taken this into account?

There are issues with Nepal and Bangladesh, which will be sorted out. This will be part of the implementation process. Whatever will be required will be done.

Has the court considered the need for clearances under the Environment Protection and Forest Conservation Acts and the National Rehabilitation Policy, and from the Planning Commission and the Cabinet?

These are all in the implementation process. Reports have to be filed. The court will consider the grounds cited by these agencies if they conclude that the project is not feasible and will dwell on it. I can file a contempt, if nothing is happening, for default or for non-compliance of the directions by the Supreme Court as mentioned in Paragraph 64 (XVI) of the judgment.

Did the UPA government make its stand clear to the court on the ILR project despite its reservations?

The government has at no stage expressed any reservation about the project. A few States may have. The Centre has never taken the stand that it is not feasible. It went along, filed status reports about what has been happening and how the matter has progressed. It did not say that it is not feasible or that we should not do it. If the government were to come to such a conclusion that it is not feasible, then it will make a somersault of its earlier position. Nobody can deny the benefits accruing from these projects.

How do you react to the criticism that the ILR can lead to fresh inter-State river disputes and that it may not solve the existing ones?

I have informed the court that in view of the provisions of the River Boards Act, 1956, enacted by Parliament, there is a declaration under Section 2 that the Central government should take under its control the regulation of inter-State rivers and river valleys. Section 13 provides for optimum utilisation of water resources and for promotion and operation of schemes of flood control. Section 15 empowers preparation of schemes to develop inter-State river or river valleys. And this has been noted in Paragraph 58 of the judgment. Therefore, if there is an existence of regulatory framework by the declaration of Parliament, there need not be any inter-State river dispute. The tribunal is not necessary. The Central government can exercise that power. The Central government never applied its mind to this Act when disputes arose and tribunals were set up. When I brought this to the notice of the court, the judges found a way to deal with the matter.

It is pointed out that the Supreme Court has failed to consider the diversity of views on the reasons for India’s water crisis and that the ILR may not be the best possible answer.

This judgment does not deal with water crisis. This judgment deals with the benefits arising from interlinking and the malice or misery that is prevailing on account of droughts and floods. This judgment does not deal with the water crisis to the extent of drinking water. But it deals with an aspect that if interlinking takes place, how many million hectares of land will be irrigated.

V VENKATESAN IN THE FRONTLINE

No more leniency to govts in delayed appeals: SC

Posted in SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on February 26, 2012

Supreme Court of India

TIMES OF INDIA

NEW DELHI: For long, government and its departments have been getting away lightly in the judiciary as courts have been lenient in viewing the delay in filing of appeals by them. But, the Supreme Court on Friday put an end to it and decided to treat government with the same yardstick used for other litigants when it comes to filing of appeals after the statutory deadline. Dismissing an appeal filed by the chief of the Post Master General against Living Media India Ltd; after 427 days of the statutory period of limitation, a bench of Justices P Sathasivam and J Chelameswar said the apex court was no more willing to buy the stock response of government departments – delay was due to red-tape and pendency of file on a bureaucrat’s desk for long.

“The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the government,” the bench said refusing to accept the contention that delays in filing of appeals by government departments are due to impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making multiple notes. “Why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because government or wing of the government is a party before us?” the bench asked.

“It is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona-fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape,” said Justice Sathasivam, who wrote the judgment.

This could hit governments hard as they are the biggest litigant before the judiciary accounting for about 40% of total cases pending in various courts either as petitioner or respondent. The sheer volume of work and lack of enough equipped manpower often leave the decision of whether to file an appeal in a limbo till higher-ups take a view of it. Besides, the decision to reduce government litigation has not trickled down.

Justice Sathasivam said: “The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condoning of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments.”

He said the law must weigh every litigant on the same scale and “should not be swirled for the benefit of few”. On the case at hand, the court slammed the postal department, saying “From day one the department or the persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this court by taking appropriate steps”.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-more-leniency-to-govts-in-delayed-appeals-SC/articleshow/12039556.cms

National Legal Research Desk on Violence Against Women and Children

Supreme Court of India

NATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH DESK

The Constitution of India provides for special treatment of women, guarantees equality and prohibits discrimination. The government of India has been strengthening various laws focused on women and children. This has been more visible since the Beijing CEDAW Conference. The recent years have been witness to some landmark interpretations and directives related to Violence against Women.  Despite the constitutional mandate of equal legal status for men and women, the same is yet to be realized. The dejure laws have not been translated into defacto situation for various reasons such as illiteracy, social practices, prejudices, cultural norms based on patriarchal values, poor representation of women in policy-making, poverty, regional disparity in development, lack of access and opportunity to information and resources, etc. The ground situation more or less remains the same.

Most of the laws come with various institutional machinery, partnership between various stakeholders and active role of NGOs.  These institutions need to be in existence in order for the law to be effective. Also the policies and programmes made at the top takes a long time to percolate to the bottom and there is an urgent need of sharing information and resoursces.

 The awareness on laws and access to justice remains dismal. At the district and the state level sensitivity on women rights among judicial officers, administration and the police is very low. This leads to a situation where the implementation of the law becomes difficult.  Recently India has increased its budgetary support for the implementation of various laws on violence against women and it becomes increasingly more important for the organization like Shakti Vahini to work on governance specially related to women and children issuesThe National Legal Research Desk (NLRD) has been instituted to strengthen the implementation of the laws related to Women and Children in India. NLRD focuses on documenting the recent changes in the law, collect and compile the Recent Landmark Judgments of the Supreme Courts of India & the High Courts and ensure wide scale dissemination of the same through the government and the non government machinery. The NLRD will work with Law Enforcement Agencies, Police Academies, Judicial Agencies, Government Agencies, Statutory Agencies, NGOs, Civil Society and Mass Media on promoting Access to Justice for Women and Children. The NLRD website is a knowledge Hub for compilation of all Laws, Judgements and Resource materials on Violence against Women and Children in India. In the first phase (2012) it will focus on the laws related to Human Trafficking, Domestic Violence, Juvenile Justice, Rape Laws, PCPNDT Act , Honour Crimes and Victim Compensation.

NATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH DESK

Where’s the ‘indictment’?

Posted in CONSTITUTION, SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on February 7, 2012

ABHISHEKH SINGHVI IN THE INDIAN EXPRESS

The Supreme Court judgment on sanction to prosecute only repeats principles set earlier — it is not a statement on the government

The apex court judgement on grant/ denial of sanction is a purely legal exercise. That should hardly need emphasis because courts are supposed to, and invariably do, eschew political comments. But for those, like the BJP, who see politics lurking in every bush, who want to sensationalise and try to make political capital out of every event, this judgment has provided another opportunity to tilt at windmills.

First, the legal aspects: The judgment has brought about much-needed certainty and clarity, but mainly by reiterating principles of law enunciated in earlier leading apex court judgments. It starts by reminding us of the established principle that sanction is not required once the public servant concerned has ceased to be employed in the post in which the alleged delinquency occurred. Several judgments, 30 to 40 years old, are cited in support.

Secondly, the apex court relies on the venerable judgment of A.R. Antulay (in the original round of which I had occasion to appear as a young lawyer), to state the twin principles that locus standi is a concept foreign to criminal law and that anyone has the right to set the criminal justice system in motion by filing a complaint before the appropriate magistrate.

Thirdly, it rejects the government’s contention to the effect that the issue of grant of sanction does not arise at the stage of filing a complaint but only at the stage of cognisance of the complaint. Again, several older apex court judgments are cited to make the point that the magistrate cannot even entertain the complaint and cannot deal with it without sanction and that sanction should ideally be filed with the complaint.

Fourthly, it reiterates the well-established principle that action on a complaint can be taken even without a police report and that the latter is not a sine qua non for action. Fifthly, it rejects the contention that investigation must compulsorily precede the taking of cognisance.

Sixthly, it reiterates the principle that grant of sanction is not a quasi-judicial process, that it is administrative in nature and that it does not require any hearing to be given to the accused. In adumbrating each of these salutary principles, Justice Singhvi quotes copiously from older apex court judgments. In agreeing with him, Justice Ganguly does the same, though quoting fewer judgments.

Seventhly, in deprecating the delay in deciding pending applications for sanction, the court again reiterates no more than the 15-year-old principle of Vineet Narain’s case that sanctions should receive urgent attention and repeats the latter judgment’s time limit of four months. In all this, the apex court has tread cautiously and surely, basing itself on established and venerable earlier apex court precedent.

Turning now to the political aspects, it is clear that for over 18 months, the opposition has tried to drag the prime minister (as also the present home minister) repeatedly into the issue, and has also tried to elicit some comment or the other, howsoever innocuous, from the apex court, so as to embarrass the head of government. Subramanian Swamy’s links to the BJP and RSS are well known, and he has publicly declared that he is on the threshold of joining the BJP. Clearly, his attempt to implicate the PM has boomeranged, since the judgment categorically gives the prime minister a clean chit and copiously discusses the issue in several paragraphs. In particular, Justice Ganguly notes that no mala fides were even alleged by Swamy, and both judges note that the delay in grant of sanction was, at best, on account of wrong advice, with no personal involvement of the prime minister. I wonder if the BJP will emphasise this part of the judgment in any print or visual media.

Secondly, the same applies to the home minister to the extent that while he has not been given a clean chit, not a single comment attaching culpability to him has been elicited by Swamy from the apex court, despite assiduous and strenuous efforts. As far as the home minister is concerned, the scene shifts to the magistrate.

Thirdly, and significantly, the very raison d’ être of sanction has been questioned by the apex court. Its existence and use over the last several decades, at least according to Justice Ganguly, raises the issue of unfair discrimination in favour of public servants and against the common man by providing an additional protective arc to the former. The parliamentary committee on the Lokpal, which I had the privilege to chair, had, for the first time in 60 years, strongly and with several reasons, recommended the abolition of all external administrative sanctions, including those under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Aact, Section 197 CrPC and the infamous single directive in Section 6A of the CBI Act, for Lokpal-covered offences. Our recommendations were accepted and the bill with these three deletions was passed in the Lok Sabha, despite vociferous BJP opposition. In the Upper House, the initiative failed, due to lack of numbers. Those who want to politicise and sensationalise must explain to the nation why they prevented the abolition of sanction.

Fourthly, the reiteration of the four-month Vineet Narain time limit for sanctions and its application even to ministers is welcome, since it brings clarity and stability. The reality is that sanctions have been languishing because of bureaucratic indifference in all governments, irrespective of political colour, for well beyond four months.

Lastly, one area where larger discussion by the apex court would have been welcome but is lacking is the area of logistical management of this issue. Theoretically, in this country of over one billion, complaints by anyone against any public servant, on the basis of newspaper reports, with no locus limitations, can arise. Sanctioning authorities may well be flooded with such requests at all administrative levels. They will have to create special and highly focused and efficient departments to deal with the flood of requests likely to arise as an unintended fallout of this judgment.

In conclusion, to describe this judgment as a “slap in the government’s face” or as “an indictment” or as a “severe embarrassment” is not only to ignore logic and twist facts but also to distort the English language!

 The writer is a Congress MP and national spokesperson, and a jurist

Justice Ganguly, noted for frank and forthright views, retires

Posted in CONSTITUTION, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, JUDICIARY, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on February 3, 2012
JUSTICE A K GANGULY

JUSTICE A K GANGULY

J VENKATESAN IN THE HINDU

He rendered landmark judgments in Supreme Court

Justice A.K. Ganguly retired on Thursday from the Supreme Court on attaining the age of superannuation. He was given a warm farewell by the members of the Bar and the Bench at a function organised by the Supreme Court Bar Association amid standing ovation from lawyers. Justice Ganguly was appointed Judge of the Supreme Court in December 2008. During his tenure spanning a little over three years, he rendered landmark judgments on various branches of law, in particular criminal jurisprudence, constitutional and human rights issues.

2G case

A bold and courageous judge, he was known for his frank and forthright views and comments, which became evident during the hearing of the 2G spectrum case since October 2010. He was part of the Bench with Justice G.S. Singhvi in the 2G case in which 122 licences were cancelled on Thursday.With a smiling face, he endeared himself to the members of the Bar and the Bench. He was the Chief Justice of Orissa and Madras High Courts, before being elevated as a Judge of the Supreme Court.Justice Ganguly was convinced enough to observe in a judgment that the Supreme Court had violated the fundamental rights of citizens during Emergency in 1975. And in an unprecedented move, he commuted to life imprisonment the death sentence, earlier upheld by it, of a man who murdered four members of a family.

Majority decision

A Bench of Justices Aftab Alam and Ganguly took the view that the majority decision of a five-member Constitution Bench upholding the suspension of fundamental rights during Emergency in the ADM Jabalpur vs Shivakant Shukla case (1976) was erroneous.Justice Ganguly, who wrote the judgment, said:

“There is no doubt that the majority judgment of this court in the ADM Jabalpur case violated the fundamental rights of a large number of people in this country. The instances of this court’s judgment violating the human rights of the citizens may be extremely rare, but it cannot be said that such a situation can never happen. We can remind ourselves of the majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in Additional District Magistrate Jabalpur.

“The majority opinion was that in view of the Presidential order dated June 27, 1975 under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution, no person has the locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for Habeas Corpus or any other writ to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained under the then law of preventive detention (MISA) on the ground that the order is illegal or malafide or not in compliance with the Act.”

Justice Ganguly, while quashing the allotment of land made to the former Indian cricket team captain, Sourav Ganguly, in Kolkata by the West Bengal government, said “We are sorry to hold that in making the impugned allotment in favour of the allottee, the State has failed to discharge its constitutional role. The said allotment was made by the government admittedly without verifying whether the allottee had surrendered the previous plot allotted to him. Such action of the government definitely smacks of arbitrariness and falls foul of Article 14.”

On Hindu law, he held that under the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA), illegitimate children would be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral.Interpreting Section 16 (3) of the HMA, he said: “Such children are only entitled to the property of their parents and not of any other relation. The relationship between the parents may not be sanctioned by law but the birth of a child in such relationship has to be viewed independently of the relationship of the parents. A child born in such relationship is innocent and is entitled to all the rights which are given to other children born in valid marriage. This is the crux of Section 16 (3).”

Justice Ganguly made it clear that the President or the Governor exercising the power of pardon in granting remission of sentence to a convict could not encroach into the judicial domain and give a finding on the guilt of the convict. If such a power was exercised arbitrarily, mala fide or in absolute disregard of the finer canons of the constitutionalism, the by-product order could not get the approval of law and in such cases, the judicial hand must be stretched to it.

Taking a serious view of the former Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, at present Union Minister for Science and Technology, interfering in a criminal investigation against a family of a Congress MLA, he imposed an exemplary cost of Rs. 10 lakh on the State government.

Coming to the rescue of hawkers, he held that they had a fundamental right to carry on with their business. He asked the Delhi government to enact law to regulate their trade keeping in mind the right of commuters to move freely and use the roads without any impediment.

On personal liberty, he said that in preventive detention cases, the representations received from the detenus must be disposed of expeditiously and every day’s delay must be properly explained and accounted for. “The representations should be very expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency and without any avoidable delay.”

Source: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2854684.ece

Government has no right to alienate, transfer or distribute natural resources/national assets otherwise than by following a fair and transparent method consistent with the fundamentals of the equality clause enshrined in the Constitution

Posted in CONSTITUTION, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, JUDICIARY, SUPREME COURT by NNLRJ INDIA on February 2, 2012

Supreme Court of India

Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others versus  Union of India and others  Writ Petition(Civil) 423 of 2010

At the outset, we consider it proper to observe that even though there is no universally accepted definition of natural resources, they are generally understood as elements having intrinsic utility to mankind. They may be renewable or non renewable. They are thought of as the individual elements of the natural environment that provide economic and social services to human society and are considered valuable in their relatively unmodified, natural, form. A natural resource’s value rests in the amount of the material available and the demand for it. The latter is determined by its usefulness to production. Natural resources belong to the people but the State legally owns them on behalf of its people and from that point of view natural resources are considered as national assets, more so because the State benefits immensely from their value. The State is empowered to distribute natural resources. However, as they constitute public property/national asset, while distributing natural resources, the State is bound to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural resources. In Article 39(b) of the Constitution it has been provided that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community should be so distributed so as to best sub-serve the common good, but no comprehensive legislation has been enacted to generally define natural resources and a framework for their protection. Of course, environment laws enacted by Parliament and State legislatures deal with specific natural resources, i.e., Forest, Air, Water, Costal Zones, etc.

The ownership regime relating to natural resources can also be ascertained from international conventions and customary international law, common law and national constitutions. In international law, it rests upon the concept of sovereignty and seeks to respect the principle of permanent sovereignty (of peoples and nations) over (their) natural resources as asserted in the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assemble and then affirmed as a customary international norm by the International Court of Justice in the case opposing the Democratic Republic of Congo to Uganda. Common Law recognizes States as having the authority to protect natural resources insofar as the resources are within the interests of the general public. The State is deemed to have a proprietary interest in natural resources and must act as guardian and trustee in relation to the same. Constitutions across the world focus on establishing natural resources as owned by, and for the benefit of, the country. In most instances where constitutions specifically address ownership of natural resources, the Sovereign State, or, as it is more commonly expressed, ‘the people’, is designated as the owner of the natural resource.

Spectrum has been internationally accepted as a scarce, finite and renewable natural resource which is susceptible to degradation in case of inefficient utilisation. It has a high economic value in the light of the demand for it on account of the tremendous growth in the telecom sector. Although it does not belong to a particular State, right of use has been granted to States as per international norms.

 In India, the Courts have given an expansive interpretation to the concept of natural resources and have from time to time issued directions, by relying upon the provisions contained in Articles 38, 39, 48, 48A and 51A(g), for protection and proper allocation/distribution of natural resources and have repeatedly insisted on compliance of the constitutional principles in the process of distribution, transfer and alienation to private persons. The doctrine of public trust, which was evolved in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois 146 U.S. 387 (1892), has been held by this Court to be a part of the Indian jurisprudence in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388 and has been applied in Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustee, Port of Mumbai (2002) 3 SCC 214, Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. (2006) 3 SCC 549 and Fomento Resorts and Hotels Limited v. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571. In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia’s case, this Court held that the State’s actions and the actions of its agencies/instrumentalities must be for the public good, achieving the objects for which they exist and should not be arbitrary or capricious. In the field of contracts, the State and its instrumentalities should design their activities in a manner which would ensure competition and not discrimination. They can augment their resources but the object should be to serve the public cause and to do public good by resorting to fair and reasonable methods. In Fomento Resorts and Hotels Limited case, the Court referred to the article of Prof. Joseph L. Sax and made the following observations:

The public trust doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. This doctrine puts an implicit embargo on the right of the State to transfer public properties to private party if such transfer affects public interest, mandates affirmative State action for effective management of natural resources and empowers the citizens to question ineffective management thereof.

 The heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf of all the people and especially future generations. For example, renewable and non-renewable resources, associated uses, ecological values or objects in which the public has a special interest (i.e. public lands, waters, etc.) are held subject to the duty of the State not to impair such resources, uses or values, even if private interests are involved. The same obligations apply to managers of forests, monuments, parks, the public domain and other public assets.Professor Joseph L. Sax in his classic article, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention” (1970), indicates that the public trust doctrine, of all concepts known to law, constitutes the best practical and philosophical premise and legal tool for protecting public rights and for protecting and managing resources, ecological values or objects held in trust.

The public trust doctrine is a tool for exerting long-established public rights over short-term public rights and private gain. Today every person exercising his or her right to use the air, water, or land and associated natural ecosystems has the obligation to secure for the rest of us the right to live or otherwise use that same resource or property for the long-term and enjoyment by future generations. To say it another way, a landowner or lessee and a water right holder has an obligation to use such resources in a manner as not to impair or diminish the people’s rights and the people’s long-term interest in that property or resource, including down slope lands, waters and resources.”

In Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v.Cricket Assn. of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161, the Court was dealing with the right of organizers of an event, such as a sport tournament, to its live audiovisual broadcast, universally, through an agency of their choice, national or foreign. In paragraph 78, the Court described the airwaves/frequencies as public property in the following words:“There is no doubt that since the airwaves/frequencies are a public property and are also limited, they have to be used in the best interest of the society and this can be done either by a central authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating the grant of licences to other agencies, including the private agencies.”

In Reliance Natural Resources Limited v. Reliance Industries Limited, (2010) 7 SCC 1, P. Sathasivam J., with whom Balakrishnan, C.J., agreed, made the following observations:  “It must be noted that the constitutional mandate is that the natural resources belong to the people of this country. The nature of the word “vest” must be seen in the context of the public trust doctrine (PTD). Even though this doctrine has been applied in cases dealing with environmental jurisprudence, it has its broader application.” Learned Judge then referred to the judgments, In re Special Reference No. 1 of 2001 (2004) 4 SCC 489, M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388 and observed:

“This doctrine is part of Indian law and finds application in the present case as well. It is thus the duty of the Government to provide complete protection to the natural resources as a trustee of the people at large.”

 The Court also held that natural resources are vested with the Government as a matter of trust in the name of the people of India, thus it is the solemn duty of the State to protect the national interest and natural resources must always be used in the interests of the country and not private interests.

 As natural resources are public goods, the doctrine of equality, which emerges from the concepts of justice and fairness, must guide the State in determining the actual mechanism for distribution of natural resources. In this regard, the doctrine of equality has two aspects: first, it regulates the rights and obligations of the State vis-à-vis its people and demands that the people be granted equitable access to natural resources and/or its products and that they are adequately compensated for the transfer of the resource to the private domain; and second, it regulates the rights and obligations of the State vis-à-vis private parties seeking to acquire/use the resource and demands that the procedure adopted for distribution is just, non-arbitrary and transparent and that it does not discriminate between similarly placed private parties.

In Akhil Bharatiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P. (2011) 5 SCC 29, this Court examined the legality of the action taken by the Government of Madhya Pradesh to allot 20 acres land to an institute established in the name of Kushabhau Thakre on the basis of an application made by the Trust. One of the grounds on which the appellant challenged the allotment of land was that the State Government had not adopted any rational method consistent with the doctrine of equality. The High Court negatived the appellant’s challenge.

 Before this Court, learned senior counsel appearing for the State relied upon the judgments in Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration (2001) 3 SCC 635, State of U.P. v. Choudhary Rambeer Singh (2008) 5 SCC 550, State of Orissa v. Gopinath Dash (2005) 13 SCC 495 and Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies (2009) 6 SCC 171 and argued that the Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review to nullify the policy framed by the State Government to allot Nazul land without advertisement.

This Court rejected the argument, referred to the judgments in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489, S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1427, Kasturilal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J & K (1980) 4 SCC 1, Common Cause v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 530, Shrilekha Vidyarthy v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212, LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482, New India Public School v. HUDA (1996) 5 SCC 510 and held:

 “What needs to be emphasised is that the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or officers of the State. Every action/decision of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or confer benefit must be founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well-defined policy, which shall be made known to the public by publication in the Official Gazette and other recognised modes of publicity and such policy must be implemented/executed by adopting a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution of largesse like allotment of land, grant of quota, permit licence, etc. by the State and its agencies/instrumentalities should always be done in a fair and equitable manner and the element of favouritism or nepotism shall not influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the particular functionary or officer of the State.”

In Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal (1987) 2 SCC 295, the Court referred to some of the precedents and laid down the following propositions:

“State-owned or public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism.”

In conclusion, we hold that the State is the legal owner of the natural resources as a trustee of the people and although it is empowered to distribute the same, the process of distribution must be guided by the constitutional principles including the doctrine of equality and larger public good.

 Can the Courts interfere in Policy decisions of the Government

In majority of judgments relied upon by learned Attorney General and learned counsel for the respondents, it has been held that the power of judicial review should be exercised with great care and circumspection and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the Government in financial matters. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that the Court cannot substitute its opinion for the one formed by the experts in the particular field and due respect should be given to the wisdom of those who are entrusted with the task of framing the policies. We are also conscious of the fact that the Court should not interfere with the fiscal policies of the State. However, when it is clearly demonstrated that the policy framed by the State or its agency/instrumentality and/or its implementation is contrary to public interest or is violative of the constitutional principles, it is the duty of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in larger public interest and reject the stock plea of the State that the scope of judicial review should not be exceeded beyond the recognised parameters. When matters like these are brought before the judicial constituent of the State by public spirited citizens, it becomes the duty of the Court to exercise its power in larger public interest and ensure that the institutional integrity is not compromised by those in whom the people have reposed trust and who have taken oath to discharge duties in accordance with the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill will and who, as any other citizen, enjoy fundamental rights and, at the same time, are bound to perform the duties enumerated in Article 51A. Reference in this connection can usefully be made to the judgment of the three Judge Bench headed by Chief Justice Kapadia in Centre for P.I.L. v. Union of India (2011) 4 SCC 1.

Before concluding, we consider it imperative to observe that but for the vigilance of some enlightened citizens who held important constitutional and other positions and discharged their duties in larger public interest and Non Governmental Organisations who have been constantly fighting for clean governance and accountability of the constitutional institutions, unsuspecting citizens and the Nation would never have known how the scarce natural resource spared by Army has been grabbed by those who enjoy money power and who have been able to manipulate the system.

%d bloggers like this: