Sixty years after India became a Republic, the Supreme Court posed a question on Friday on whether public servants should be entitled to red beacons, a stream of security personnel and a fleet of cars as a matter of right.Wondering what the term “public servant” actually meant, a Bench of Justices GS Singhvi and SJ Mukhopadhyay gave liberty to convert a matter challenging grant of Z-plus security to a Congress MLA from Uttar Pradesh into a PIL to examine whether there should be norms or guidelines governing grant of security to VIPs and citizens in general, to prevent it being misused.
The case before the court was an appeal filed by one Abhay Singh through advocate CD Singh challenging grant of high security to one Pramod Tewari, MLA from Pratapgarh. The security was provided to him in 1985 for inviting wrath of the Sikh militants over an objectionable statement made by him. The Centre placed him in its prime security zone without reviewing the threat perception for decades together. Close to 50 security personnel were posted with him along with a fleet of cars, each attached with beacon light, causing inconvenience and terror among local residents.
Senior advocate Harish Salve, who questioned the entitlement of Tewari to secure Z-plus security, forced the Court to think on the larger issue involved. Since India became a Republic in January 1950, “any symbol of authority or superiority conferred by the Government or allowed by the government would fall foul of such a principle of egalitarianism.” Moreover, Article 18 abolished all titles and granting security as a matter of entitlement to public servants vitiated the very concept of the term defined under Article 309, Salve added. Conscious of the abuse of the security apparatus, the bench said, “This is a very serious issue. We will convert it into a PIL.”
What caught the imagination of the court was Salve’s insistence to remove such symbols that made public servants a crest above common man. Giving a historical context to the issue under debate, Salve maintained that public servants during British rule were foreign citizens who owed allegiance to the Crown and thus were awarded these symbols.
But it ceased after India gave itself a Constitution. Unfortunately, he remarked, “It is now a common practice amongst those who hold public office or are connected with political parties and organisations to seek security.” The Bench agreed, “public servants are actually servants of the public,” giving permission to Salve to file a fresh petition stressing this point.
The Anna Hazare-led civil society movement cannot be faulted for having come up with its version of the Lokpal Bill, because otherwise it would have been accused of campaigning for something essentially negative – the withdrawal of the flawed government version without putting forward an alternative. Frustration with everyday corruption – as well as the spectacular kind that explodes in the public sphere ever so often ( Commonwealth Games, 2G, Adarsh, illegal mining in Bellary district etc) – explains the widespread popular support received by the anti-corruption movement.
The depth of this support, coming from every corner of the country, should tell the government something. While the value of the movement lies in having highlighted the critically important issue of corruption – which has not been dealt with seriously by successive governments – the Jan Lokpal Bill put forward by Team Anna too is flawed in some of its specifics.
If the government Bill is minimalist, setting up a toothless ombudsman with limited powers, the Jan Lokpal is too overarching in its design and could topple under its own weight. It is somewhat contradictory in its approach, in that it envisions a superior layer of bureaucracy to fix bureaucratic corruption. If the government version of the Lokpal Bill can be likened to a cop with a lathi confronting an AK-47 wielding terrorist, the Jan Lokpal could be the equivalent of the trigger-happy supercop mowing down innocent citizens in his rage to establish order.
A third version of the Lokpal Bill, formulated by Aruna Roy and the National Campaign for Peoples’ Right to Information (NCPRI), is superior to both the government version and the Jan Lokpal Bill. We are in sympathy with its broad philosophy, which is to have a series of interlocking bodies which will act as a check on each other rather than a centralised, overarching Lokpal which supervises everything. The way to check corruption is through an architecture of mutually supportive legislation, rather than through a single Bill which is required to deliver a magic bullet. This vision is best embodied in the NCPRI design.
The biggest flaw in the government version is that it excludes many categories of public servants from its ambit – anyone below grade A in the central government, state-level civil servants, the judiciary, the PM while he is in office. Moreover the dice is loaded in favour of the accused, which would make it extremely difficult to bring powerful people to justice and therefore defeat the purpose of the Bill.
For example, while there is no provision to protect whistleblowers, the Bill provides for all incriminating evidence to be made available to the accused even before the registration of an FIR. Moreover, the tough punishment provided for the subjectively determined ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious’ complaint (two to five years imprisonment) would deter most victims of corruption from lodging a complaint.
The Jan Lokpal Bill corrects for flaws in the government version by including everybody under the ambit of the Lokpal. Besides corruption cases, the Lokpal is asked to look into grievance redressal as well. This leaves it with the unenviable task of policing some four million employees of the central government alone, among many other categories.
Like our present court system, the Jan Lokpal could simply get buried under a backlog of cases. Moreover, too much power would be concentrated in the Jan Lokpal. Complaints against it may be lodged in the courts. But since the judiciary itself will be under the Jan Lokpal, that would have a chilling effect on any judgments against it.
For anti-corruption laws to work, the remit of anti-corruption bodies must be specific and focussed. To have a manageable task on its hands, the Lokpal should focus on corruption cases involving MPs, ministers and senior officers in the central government. If corrupt officers at grade A level are punished, the message is bound to percolate downwards. Besides, there can be other agencies to check corruption at other levels (more about this soon).
For the same reasons the Lokpal should confine itself to cases where public servants are involved, and not stray into cases of NGO or corporate fraud. The government Lokpal envisages harsh penalties for NGOs, the Jan Lokpal and NCPRI versions do the same for corporates. But the job of public servants is to regulate the working of civil society institutions. If public servants were honest and only some corporates and NGOs were corrupt, we wouldn’t have so much of a problem as the government can throw the book at the latter using a whole gamut of legal instruments: the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, IPC provisions which deal with bribery and corruption, income tax laws, the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act and so on.
The real problem arises when the regulators themselves, ie public servants, are corrupt. Anti-corruption laws will work if we keep the architecture simple, without diversionary red herrings – the government polices civil society, Lokpal polices the government.
Who polices the Lokpal? It could be the Supreme Court, which would entail keeping the higher judiciary outside the purview of the Lokpal. The NCPRI suggests strengthening the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill as a check on judicial corruption. But a superior solution is to have a National Judicial Commission (NJC), which would look at judicial appointments as well.
If the quality of judges in the Supreme Court and high courts could be regulated at entry, that would be a more holistic way of dealing with corruption. To widen the scope of discussion on judicial practices, the NJC should incorporate a balanced mix of non-judicial members as well (the relevant authority in the current Judicial Bill can induct only judges and members of the legal profession). It may require a constitutional amendment to set up the NJC, but the government could commit to bring in such an amendment within a year.
As for dealing with corruption at other tiers of public service, the NCPRI makes sound suggestions. A strengthened Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) can look at corruption among civil servants below grade A level. State Lokayuktas should be appointed to rein in corruption at the state level.
While a serving prime minister should be under the aegis of the Lokpal, strong safeguards are needed to ensure he is not unduly harassed in conducting the work of government. A full bench of the Supreme Court should be convinced there is a prima facie case and clear the investigation, vicarious liability (due to misconduct of other ministers) shouldn’t be considered, national security matters should be kept outside the purview of the Lokpal.
There is need for a strong Bill to protect whistleblowers. Another one should set up a grie-vance redressal commission, to look into redress of grievances not amounting to corruption. Finally, it’s important to remember that corruption cannot be controlled through punitive steps alone. Side by side, we need to reform the system to reduce incentives for corruption. For that we need to look carefully at policies and processes through which scarce resources such as land, spectrum and minerals are allocated. We also need to look at how elections are funded. High stamp duties, for example, incentivise the undervaluing of property and therefore the setting up of a black economy. Heavily distorted land markets make the rise of a land mafia inevitable. Rs 40 lakh as the legally designated upper limit for electoral spending by a Lok Sabha candidate is ridiculously low and impractical, inviting evasion by successful candidates.
Perhaps, instead of a mechanical cap on spending we need to put in place a full disclosure requirement, whereby every candidate is obliged to place on record all campaign contributions received beyond a prescribed minimum level. For insights into how reforming the system (as opposed to punitive measures alone) could reduce incentives for corruption, watch this space tomorrow for an article on the subject by Arvind Panagariya.
Tackling graft: The many drafts
Whom should the Lokpal cover?
GoI Lokpal draft: Includes NGOs in the Lokpal’s ambit
Jan Lokpal draft : Includes corporates in its purview
NCPRI draft: Includes corporates within its radar
Times View: The Lokpal must focus on graft in government. Existing laws should be strongly applied to corrupt practices in civil society but the Lokpal must focus on corruption within government.
The higher judiciary
GoI Lokpal draft: Excludes the higher judiciary from the Lokpal’s purview
Jan Lokpal draft: Includes the higher judiciary within the Lokpal’s purview
NCPRI draft: Excludes the higher judiciary from the Lokpal’s ambit – it instead proposes a stronger Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill for tackling issues of corruption in the judiciary
Times View: The judiciary must be free to survey the Lokpal itself. The judiciary can be managed via a National Judicial Commission – that’s better than just a Judicial Accountability Bill as it surveys graft and legal appointments and is open to non-legal members too
Covering the PM
GoI Lokpal draft: The PM is under the Lokpal’s purview – but only after leaving office
Jan Lokpal draft: The PM is fully included while in office
NCPRI draft: The PM is included during office – with proper safeguards
Times View: The PM should be included – with due checks. The NCPRI draft provides good safeguards (due process, no vicarious liability and confidentiality on matters of national interest)
GoI Lokpal draft: Only includes Group A officers under the Lokpal’s purview
Jan Lokpal draft: Includes all government servants
NCPRI draft: Envisions all government officers outside Group A to be surveyed by a stronger CVC’s office
Times View: The Lokpal must focus on corruption in high places. Putting all government officials under it is over-burdening it. A stronger CVC and state-level Lokayuktas should oversee all officers outside senior level
Public grievance redressal
GoI Lokpal draft: Makes no provisions for public grievances or their redressal
Jan Lokpal draft: Includes public grievances and redressal at all levels under the Lokpal
NCPRI draft: Envisions a separate commission specifically to hear public grievances and manage redressal
Times View: The Lokpal is a unique institution designed to weed out corruption in government. As the NCPRI draft suggests, public grievances over a range of issues should be routed to another body that can make enquiries at diverse levels and make effective, hard-hitting changes where needed
The ushering in of a Lokpal should in no way dilute the CBI’s legal authority or operational effectiveness.
It is a happy turn of events that there is, at last, a kind of truce between the Central government and the Anna Hazare Team on the Lokpal issue. Both sides have displayed a measure of maturity that augurs well for the future of public life in India. The stage is now set for some animated but objective discussion of the law that will concretise the idea of a strong ombudsman. It is not enough for the two sides to say that they are for a credible Lokpal. They need to go the extra length to accommodate each other’s sensitivities. Otherwise things will be back to square one. This is why a lot of importance should be attached to the meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee scheduled in the next few days.
The Anna Team’s focus is rightly on the status of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the future scheme of things. With all its faults — some real and many imaginary — the CBI is still the best bet to strike at the venality that marks public life in India.
To say that politicians alone are guilty of corruption, an impression given by the Anna Team, is greatly skewed. Civil service misdeeds are equally enormous and cannot be ignored. Take, for instance, the recent arrest of a senior Income Tax Department official who allegedly demanded a sum of Rs.50 lakh to overlook the suppression of unaccounted income by a company. Instances are legion of top officials of enforcement agencies asking for a bribe without any sense of shame or fear. The magnitude of corruption in the Central government departments is mind-boggling, and this is why we first need an effective anti-graft machinery at the Centre, rather than in the States. The corruption in the States could be tackled subsequently. If the Lokpal is unable to cut at the roots of the civil servant-politician nexus in promoting dishonesty, it would have hardly justified its creation.
The ushering in of a Lokpal should in no way dilute the CBI’s legal authority or its operational effectiveness. This should be the starting point for any discussions of the Standing Committee. A former Union Minister, referring to the plea for total autonomy for the CBI from the Executive, asked this writer some time ago as to who exactly the organisation should be answerable to if it wants to be autonomous — particularly when monitoring of all CBI cases by the judiciary was impractical. This query by an otherwise well-meaning public figure summarises the political perspective of the whole issue of the CBI’s autonomy. It reveals the unconcealed desire of the average politician to somehow retain at least a semblance of control over the CBI.
It is generally known that the senior bureaucracy is also not exactly unhappy with the current state of affairs wherein the CBI is under the thumb of the Department of Personnel. Perhaps the most significant move that came in 2003 was the insertion of Section 6A in the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, making it mandatory for the CBI to get prior government permission before it can even proceed with a preliminary enquiry (PE) against an official of and above the rank of Joint Secretary. This was a dubious amendment to the Act, based on the specious ground of saving civil servants from needless harassment by the CBI. But it amounted to deliberate emasculation of an organisation that requires teeth to tackle public servant corruption. The provision has been questioned in judicial forums as violative of the fundamental right of citizens to equality before law. Let us hope that this issue is resolved soon in favour of maintaining the integrity of the public services.
It is against this backdrop that the Anna Team’s demand to bifurcate the CBI, attaching its anti-corruption wing with the proposed Lokpal machinery, should be examined. This is ostensibly in order to remove the organisation from the clutches of the Executive. The rationale is unexceptionable. The practicality of the proposed arrangement is, however, highly debatable.
The CBI does not operate with any watertight compartmentalisation of its numerous wings. No doubt there is a distinct Anti-Corruption Wing functioning at its headquarters. In the field units the distinction is, however, blurred. There is a pooling of resources at all levels when a major case, invariably a sensational conventional crime, is investigated by the CBI at the request of a State government or on the orders of a court. This will no longer be possible if a large chunk of the CBI representing the anti-corruption staff is removed and tagged on to the Lokpal. The current top brass of the organisation are reportedly opposed to such an arrangement, which would deny them the substantial manpower needed for non-anti-corruption work. The CBI’s resources are already quite slender, making it difficult to cope with the nearly 1,000 cases registered by it each year and about 7,000 cases that are on trial.
Following the Vineet Narain judgment (1997) by the Supreme Court, the superintendence of the CBI’s anti-corruption work is with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). This is a nominal arrangement which has worked reasonably well, because we have had some non-interfering and mature Central Vigilance Commissioners, and an equally responsible and self-effacing CBI leadership. Under an aggressive and egoistic CVC this arrangement could have become untenable. If, however, you want to disturb this stable state of affairs with a view to yielding to the demand of the Anna Team, the whole process of transition will have to be carefully conceived and worked out.
As one who has headed the CBI, I am totally against any dismemberment of the organisation. That would cause more harm than good to the objective of rooting out corruption. If the Lokpal becomes a reality, the most sensible thing to do would be to transfer the existing authority of superintendence of the CBI from the CVC to the Lokpal. Any other arrangement would result in the creation of two separate investigating agencies, namely, the CBI, and the small unit envisaged for the Lokpal. That would lead to confusion and a clash of functions. Along with such empowerment, the Lokpal could be conferred the authority (that currently vests with the government) to sanction the prosecution of public servants. This can be done by suitably amending Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The power enjoyed by the government under Sections 377 and 378 of the CrPC to deny or accord permission to the CBI to go on appeal or prefer a revision petition against the orders of lower courts could also be vested in the Lokpal. It should be remembered that we have been witness to totally political decisions in such matters. Finally, the entire budget allocation for the CBI could be placed at the hands of the Lokpal, so that the CBI enjoys freedom from any tendentious holding up by government of sanctions of money required for its day-to-day running and implementing its long-term projects.
All these suggested moves may be viewed as being too drastic. But, then, without them the CBI will remain tied to the apron strings of the Executive. The former Chief Justice of India, J.S. Verma, must be a disappointed man. His bold judgment in the Vineet Narain case was aimed at insulating the CBI totally from political caprice. If, however, in the public perception this has not materialised, both the organisation’s leadership and the executive will have to bear the cross.
The opportunity that is currently available to improve the image of the CBI through a thoughtful fusing of the agency with the Lokpal should not be frittered away. A lot of magnanimity on the part of the current Executive is called for. At the same time, the role of the media and the citizenry at large in bringing enough pressure for a reform of the system can hardly be overemphasised.
(Dr. R.K. Raghavan is a former director of the Central Bureau of Investigation.)
The Union Cabinet today approved the proposal for the enactment of a new legislation in the form of the Lokpal Bill, 2011. The Bill provides for the establishment of the institution of Lokpal to inquire into allegations of corruption against certain public functionaries and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
The Bill envisages setting up the institution of Lokpal consisting of Chairperson and eight Members with the stipulation that half of the Members shall be Judicial Members. It will have its own Investigation Wing and Prosecution Wing with such officers and staff as are necessary to carry out its functions.
The Lokpal shall inquire into allegations of corruption made in respect of Prime Minister, after he has demitted office; a Minister of the Union; a Member of Parliament; any Group ‘A’ officer or equivalent; Chairperson or member or officer equivalent to Group ‘A’ in any body/ Board/ corporation/ authority/ company/ society/ trust/ autonomous body established by an Act of Parliament or wholly or partly financed or controlled by the Central Government; any director, manager, secretary or other officer of a society or association of persons or trust wholly or partly financed or aided by the Government or in receipt of any donations from the public and whose annual income exceeds such amount as the Central Government may by notification specify. However, the organisations created for religious purposes and receiving public donations would be outside the purview of Lokpal.
Rather than gunning for the corrupt and corruption, governments Lokpal seems to be gunning for those who complain against corruption. How will Governments Lokpal work?
Suppose some citizen files a complaint to Lokpal against some corrupt government servant. Before the investigations actually start, the government servant can file a cross complaint against the citizen straight to the special court, without any preliminary enquiry by any agency, that the complaint is false or frivolous. The government will provide free advocate to the government servant to file this case. The citizen will have to defend himself on his own!
Then there is stiffer punishment for the complainant than the corrupt government servant. If the Special Court concludes that the complaint is frivolous or false, the citizen faces a minimum of two years of punishment. But if the corruption charges against government servant are proved, there is a minimum of six months of punishment for the corrupt government servant!
Governments Lokpal will have jurisdiction over all NGOs in the country but it will have jurisdiction over less then o.5% of all government employees. Government argued that the Lokpal would get overwhelmed with too many cases if all public servants were brought under its ambit. So, government has restricted its jurisdiction only to 65,000 Group A officers. Also, state employees will not be covered by Lokpal. There are 4 million central government employees and 8 million state government employees.
In sharp contrast, all NGOs are covered under governments Lokpal, small or big, whether in state or centre. Even unregistered groups of people in remote villages are covered under the ambit of Lokpal. So, in a remote village, if a group of youngsters detect corruption in panchayat works using RTI, the youngsters can be hauled up by Lokpal but Lokpal would not have jurisdiction over Sarpanch, BDO or their corruption.
Whereas Lokpal would not have jurisdiction over Delhi government officials, it would have jurisdiction over all RWAs in Delhi. All small neighborhood groups who raise donations to do Ramlila or Durga Puja would be under Lokpals scanner. Lokpal could haul up activists from any of the farmers, labour, anti-corruption, land, tribal or any other movements. All the movements whether registered or not, are under the jurisdiction of Lokpal.
There are 4.3 lakh registered NGOs. But there would be several million unregistered groups across the country. Lokpal would have jurisdiction over all of them. No one can dispute the fact that corruption in NGOs needs to be addressed. But how can you leave most public servants out of Lokpals purview but bring NGOs upto village level within its purview?
Lokpal should have power to investigate allegations of corruption against PM. Special safeguards provided against frivolous and mischievous complaints
PM kept out of Lokpals purview.
As of today, corruption by PM can be investigated under Prevention of Corruption Act. Government wants investigations to be done by CBI, which comes directly under him, rather than independent Lokpal
Lokpal should have powers to investigate allegation of corruption against judiciary. Special safeguards provided against frivolous and mischievous complaints
Judiciary kept out of Lokpal purview.
Government wants this to be included in Judicial Accountability Bill (JAB). Under JAB, permission to enquire against a judge will be given by a three member committee (two judges from the same court and retd Chief justice of the same court). There are many such flaws in JAB. We have no objections to judiciary being included in JAB if a strong and effective JAB were considered and it were enacted simultaneously.
Lokpal should be able to investigate allegations that any MP had taken bribe to vote or speak in Parliament.
Government has excluded this from Lokpals purview.
Taking bribe to vote or speak in Parliament strikes at the foundations of our democracy. Governments refusal to bring it under Lokpal scrutiny virtually gives a license to MPs to take bribes with impunity.
Violation of citizens charter (if an officer does not do a citizens work in prescribed time) by an officer should be penalized and should be deemed to be corruption.
No penalties proposed. So, this will remain only on paper.
Government had agreed to our demand in the Joint committee meeting on 23rd May. It is unfortunate they have gone back on this decision.
CBI is misused by governments. Recently, govt has taken CBI out of RTI, thus further increasing the scope for corruption in CBI. CBI will remain corrupt till it remains under governments control
Selection of Lokpal members
1. Broad based selection committee with 2 politicians, four judges and two independent constitutional authorities. 2. An independent search committee consisting of retd constitutional authorities to prepare first list. 3. A detailed transparent and participatory selection process.
1. With five out of ten members from ruling establishment and six politicians in selection committee, government has ensured that only weak, dishonest and pliable people would be selected.
2. Search committee to be selected by selection committee, thus making them a pawn of selection committee
3. No selection process provided. It will completely depend on selection committee
Governments proposal ensures that the government will be able to appoint its own people as Lokpal members and Chairperson. Interestingly, they had agreed to the selection committee proposed by us in the meeting held on 7th May. There was also a broad consensus on selection process. However, there was a disagreement on composition of search committee. We are surprised that they have gone back on the decision.
Who will Lokpal be accountable to?
To the people. A citizen can make a complaint to Supreme Court and seek removal.
To the Government. Only government can seek removal of Lokpal
With selection and removal of Lokpal in governments control, it would virtually be a puppet in governments hands, against whose seniormost functionaries it is supposed to investigate, thus causing serious conflict of interest.
Integrity of Lokpal staff
Complaint against Lokpal staff will be heard by an independent authority
Lokpal itself will investigate complaints against its own staff, thus creating serious conflicts of interest
Governments proposal creates a Lokpal, which is accountable either to itself or to the government. We have suggested giving these controls in the hands of the citizens.
Method of enquiry
Method would be the same as provided in CrPC like in any other criminal case. After preliminary enquiry, an FIR will be registered. After investigations, case will be presented before a court, where the trial will take place
CrPC being amended. Special protection being provided to the accused. After preliminary enquiry, all evidence will be provided to the accused and he shall be heard as to why an FIR should not be regd against him. After completion of investigations, again all evidence will be provided to him and he will be given a hearing to explain why a case should not be filed against him in the court. During investigations, if investigations are to be started against any new persons, they would also be presented with all evidence against them and heard.
Investigation process provided by the government would severely compromise all investigations. If evidence were made available to the accused at various stages of investigations, in addition to compromising the investigations, it would also reveal the identity of whistleblowers thus compromising their security. Such a process is unheard of in criminal jurisprudence anywhere in the world. Such process would kill almost every case.
All those defined as public servants in Prevention of Corruption Act would be covered. This includes lower bureaucracy.
Only Group A officers will be covered.
One fails to understand governments stiff resistance against bringing lower bureaucracy under Lokpals ambit. This appears to be an excuse to retain control over CBI because if all public servants are brought under Lokpals jurisdiction, government would have no excuse to keep CBI.
The same bill should provide for Lokpal at centre and Lokayuktas in states
Only Lokpal at the centre would be created through this Bill.
According to Mr Pranab Mukherjee, some of the CMs have objected to providing Lokayuktas through the same Bill. He was reminded that state Information Commissions were also set up under RTI Act through one Act only.
Lokpal will be required to provide protection to whistleblowers, witnesses and victims of corruption
No mention in this law.
According to govt, protection for whistleblowers is being provided through a separate law. But that law is so bad that it has been badly trashed by standing committee of Parliament last month. The committee was headed by Ms Jayanthi Natrajan. In the Jt committee meeting held on 23rd May, it was agreed that Lokpal would be given the duty of providing protection to whistleblowers under the other law and that law would also be discussed and improved in joint committee only. However, it did not happen.
Special benches in HC
High Courts will set up special benches to hear appeals in corruption cases to fast track them
No such provision.
One study shows that it takes 25 years at appellate stage in corruption cases. This ought to be addressed.
On the basis of past experience on why anti-corruption cases take a long time in courts and why do our agencies lose them, some amendments to CrPC have been suggested to prevent frequent stay orders.
Dismissal of corrupt government servant
After completion of investigations, in addition to filing a case in a court for prosecution, a bench of Lokpal will hold open hearings and decide whether to remove the government servant from job.
The minister will decide whether to remove a corrupt officer or not. Often, they are beneficiaries of corruption, especially when senior officer are involved. Experience shows that rather than removing corrupt people, ministers have rewarded them.
Power of removing corrupt people from jobs should be given to independent Lokpal rather than this being decided by the minister in the same department.
Punishment for corruption
1. Maximum punishment is ten years
2. Higher punishment if rank of accused is higher
3. Higher fines if accused are business entities
4. If successfully convicted, a business entity should be blacklisted from future contracts.
None of these accepted. Only maximum punishment raised to 10 years.
Lokpal 11 members collectively will decide how much budget do they need
Finance ministry will decide the quantum of budget
This seriously compromises with the financial independence of Lokpal
Prevent further loss
Lokpal will have a duty to take steps to prevent corruption in any ongoing activity, if brought to his notice. If need be, Lokpal will obtain orders from High Court.
No such duties and powers of Lokpal
2G is believed to have come to knowledge while the process was going on. Shouldnt some agency have a duty to take steps to stop further corruption rather than just punish people later?
Lokpal bench will grant permission to do so
Home Secretary would grant permission.
Home Secretary is under the control of precisely those who would be under scanner. It would kill investigations.
Delegation of powers
Lokpal members will only hear cases against senior officers and politicians or cases involving huge amounts. Rest of the work will be done by officers working under Lokpal
All work will be done by 11 members of Lokpal. Practically no delegation.
This is a sure way to kill Lokpal. The members will not be able to handle all cases. Within no time, they would be overwhelmed.
Only government funded NGOs covered
All NGOs, big or small, are covered.
A method to arm twist NGOs
False, Frivolous and vexatious complaints
No imprisonment. Only fines on complainants. Lokpal would decide whether a complaint is frivolous or vexatious or false.
Two to five years of imprisonment and fine. The accused can file complaint against complainant in a court. Interestingly, prosecutor and all expenses of this case will be provided by the government to the accused. The complainant will also have to pay a compensation to the accused.
This will give a handle to every accused to browbeat complainants. Often corrupt people are rich. They will file cases against complainants and no one will dare file any complaint. Interestingly, minimum punishment for corruption is six months but for filing false complaint is two years.