LAW RESOURCE INDIA

River-engineering and the courts

Posted in ACCESS TO JUSTICE, CONSTITUTION, COURTS, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, GOVERNANCE by NNLRJ INDIA on March 12, 2012

BY V R KRISHNA IYER PUBLISHED IN THE HINDU

The concept of judicial infallibility is valid, but a legal pronouncement need not always be the last word on a given subject.

The article in The Hindu by Ramaswamy R. Iyer, “With all due respect, My Lords,” on March 2, a critical study of the ruling of the Supreme Court giving certain directions under the authority of Article 141, relating to inter-linking of rivers was noteworthy. And his request to reconsider the decision deserves serious consideration.

What the Supreme Court decides is final not because it is infallible; it is infallible because it is constitutionally final and structurally supreme. If ignorance is made final, governance becomes chaos. That is why the Montesquieuan theory of the trinity of instrumentalities is accepted by many Constitutions across the world, including the Indian Constitution. What is in the realm of the Executive is decided by the Executive. What is legislative, in the shape of law, is decided by the Legislature. When there is a dispute over a fact or law, the decision of the court is final, and all the other branches of the structure are bound by the judicial decision.

From this perspective, river disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the judiciary. But, for instance, how high an aircraft should fly without the possibility of danger, or how a safe dam should be constructed to store water, are matters highly technical, and hence these do not belong to jurisprudence or judges. I was once a Minister for Irrigation and Electricity (in Kerala) and started projects on the advice of engineers. The court never interfered, nor could they. There may be some areas where submergence by a river may cause risks — and on the basis of clear technical advice a court may pronounce an order. The jurisdictional borders of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary are fairly clear, and one of them cannot interfere with the other. Viewed from this angle, I agree with Mr. Ramaswamy Iyer’s critical observations.

Judges, merely because they wear robes, cannot decide on the course of rivers, whether they should be linked or not, and if at all, how they should be linked — just as they cannot decide on matters to do with the safety of flights or other such technical issues. Judges are not infallible; and they cannot issue executive directions or promulgate legal mandates or punitive impositions in such contexts.

‘Hasten slowly’

The central flaw of the Supreme Court’s verdict on the inter-linking issue is the failure to realise that a pan-Indian river project may have dangerous limitations. The Ganga and the Cauvery are two great rivers, but they cannot be linked up without first making a careful and exhaustive study of the various features of the terrain through which they flow over a vast territory of India. Otherwise, it may well end up as a horrendous blunder, irreparable after the decision is operationalised. A national debate involving also the great engineers, especially river engineers, that we have is essential before undertaking the implementation of a national project such as this.

The Supreme Court is indeed infallible, but while in its jural specialties it may well be top of the league, it is largely innocent in matters to do with mighty river-engineering. Therefore, great caution with all the wisdom at our command, must first be used to study the implications and the perils of this Himalayan-scale project before implementing a juristic wonder beyond what the Supreme Court has so lightly directed. Where the implications are too great to grasp and the consequences may be beyond repair, “hasten slowly” will be a good piece advice. Never assume that the robed wisdom that is good for jurisprudence will not land us in dangerous waters.

Therefore, never be in a hurry. Study every dimension of this huge project. When the project was announced a decade ago in 2002, one section of public opinion supported it, and another opposed its implementation. It is without taking any note of the conflicting public opinion that the present binding directions have been issued by the court.

(V.R. Krishna Iyer was a Judge of the Supreme Court of India.)

Let us amend the law, it is only fair to women

THE HINDU / JUSTICE DR  A R LAKSHMANAN

This refers to the article “A law that thwarts justice” ( The Hindu , June 27, 2011) by Ms. Prabha Sridevan, former Judge of the Madras High Court. I have analysed it and am in agreement with the views expressed by the author for my own reasons.

As Chairman of the Law Commission of India, I took up for consideration the necessity of amending Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which deals with the general rules of Succession in the case of female Hindus dying intestate — not having made a will before one dies — in view of the vast societal changes that have taken place.

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is part of the Hindu Code which includes the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

The Hindu Succession Act made a revolutionary change in the law for female Hindus. For the first time, a Hindu female could become an absolute owner of property. She could inherit equally with a male counterpart and a widow was also given importance regarding the succession of her husband’s property as also to her father’s property. The Act was amended in 2005 to provide that the daughter of a co-parcener in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law shall, by birth, become a co-parcener in her own right in the same manner as the son, having the same rights and liabilities in respect of the said property as that of a son.

Scheme of succession

Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act propounds a definite and uniform scheme of succession to the property of a female Hindu who dies intestate. There are also rules set out in Section 16 of the Act which provides for the order of succession and the manner of distribution among heirs of a female Hindu.

Source of acquisition

The group of heirs of the female Hindu dying intestate is described in 5 categories as ‘a’ to ‘e’ of Section 15 (1) which is illustrated as under:

In a case where she dies intestate leaving property, her property will firstly devolve upon her sons and daughters so also the husband. The children of any pre-deceased son or daughter are also included in the first category of heirs of a female Hindu;

In case she does not have any heir as referred to above, i.e., sons, daughters and husband including children of any pre-deceased sons or daughters (as per clause ‘a’) living at the time of her death, then the next heirs will be the heirs of the husband ;

Thirdly, if there are no heirs of the husband, the property would devolve upon the mother and father ;

Fourthly, if the mother and father are not alive, then the property would devolve upon the heirs of the father which means brother, sister, etc ;

The last and the fifth category is the heirs of the mother upon whom the property of the female Hindu will devolve if in the absence of any heirs falling in the four preceding categories.

This is the general rule of succession, but the Section also provides for two exceptions which are stated in Sub-Section (2). Accordingly, if a female dies without leaving any issue, then the property inherited by her from her father or mother will not devolve according to the rules laid down in the five entries as stated earlier, but upon the heirs of father. And secondly, in respect of the property inherited by her from her husband or father-in-law, the same will devolve not according to the general rule, but upon the heirs of the husband.

The Hindu Succession Bill, 1954, as originally introduced in the Rajya Sabha, did not contain any clause corresponding to Sub-Section (2) of Section 15. It came to be incorporated on the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament. The intent of the legislature is clear that the property, if it originally belonged to the parents of the deceased female, should go to the legal heirs of the father.

So also under Clause (b) of Sub Section (2) of Section 15, the property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or her father-in-law shall also under similar circumstances, devolve upon the heirs of the husband. It is the source from which the property was inherited by the female, which is more important for the purpose of devolution of her property. The fact that a female Hindu originally had a limited right and after acquiring the full right, would not, in any way, alter the rules of succession given in Sub Section (2) of Section 15.

The 174 {+t} {+h} Report of the Law Commission also examined the subject of “Property Rights of Women; Proposed Reforms under the Hindu Law” and had noted that the rules of devolution of the property of a female who dies intestate reflects patriarchal assumptions.

The basis of inheritance of a female Hindu’s property who dies intestate would thus be the SOURCE from which such female Hindu came into the possession of the property and the manner of inheritance which would decide the manner of devolution.

The term ‘property’ though not specified in this Section means property of the deceased heritable under the Act. It includes both movable and immovable property owned and acquired by her by inheritance or by devise or at a partition or by gift or by her skill or exertion or by purchase or prescription. This Section does not differentiate between the property inherited and self-acquired property of a Hindu female; it only prescribes that if a property is inherited from husband or father-in-law, it would go to her husband’s heirs and if the property is inherited from her father or mother, in that case, the property would not go to her husband’s, but to the heirs of the father and mother.

This is very aptly illustrated by the following illustration:- A married Hindu female dies intestate leaving the property which is her self-acquired property. She has no issue and was a widow at the time of her death. As per the present position of law, her property would devolve in the second category, i.e., to her husband’s heirs. Thus, in a case where the mother of her husband is alive, her whole property would devolve on her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law is also not alive, it would devolve as per the rules laid down in case of a male Hindu dying intestate, i.e., if the father of her deceased husband is alive, the next to inherit will be her father-in-law and if in the third category, the father-in-law is also not alive, then her property would devolve on the brother and sister of the deceased husband.

Thus, in the case of the self-acquired property of a Hindu married female dying intestate, her property devolves on her husband’s heirs. Her paternal and material heirs do not inherit, but the distant relations of her husband would inherit as per the husband’s heirs.

The case for change

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted when, in the structure of the Hindu society, women hardly went out to work. There has been a vast change in the social scene in the past few years and women have made progress in all spheres. The consequence is that women are owning property earned by their own skill. These situations were not foreseen by the legislators.

If that is so, what is the impact of these socio-economic changes? Do they warrant any change in the law of succession in relation to the property of a female Hindu dying intestate? What is the fallout of a gradual disintegration of the joint Hindu family and the emergence of nuclear families as a unit of society over the years in the context of law of succession governing the issue at hand?

A fundamental tenet of the law of succession has been the proximity of relation in which a Successor stands to the person who originally held the property that may be the subject matter of inheritance in a given case. The fact that women have been given the right to inherit from her parental side also assumes relevance in the present context. These developments and changes lead to competing arguments and approaches that may be taken in re-defining the law of succession in case of a female Hindu dying intestate. Thus, three alternative options emerge for consideration, namely:

1. Self-acquired property of a female Hindu dying intestate should devolve first upon her heirs from the natal family.

2. Self-acquired property of a female Hindu dying intestate should devolve equally upon the heirs of her husband and the heirs from her natal family.

3. Self-acquired property of a female Hindu dying intestate should devolve first upon the heirs of her husband.

The third option may be taken first as this can be disposed of summarily. The option essentially means continuation of the status quo. We have seen earlier that socio-economic changes warrant corresponding changes in the law as well.

We may now take up the first option. The protagonists of this approach contend that the general order of succession reflects a gender bias. It will be relevant to refer to a passage in Pradhan Saxena – Succession Laws and Gender Justice in Re-defining Family Law in India by Archana Parasar, Amit Dhanda, New Delhi.

The supporters of the said approach contend that the joint family system has slowly eroded and that an increasing number of nuclear and semi-nuclear families have replaced the traditional Mitakshara Hindu joint family system. Women are also becoming more economically independent. With the growth of the nuclear family, a married woman’s dependency on her natal family and continued closeness to it is much greater today even if it was not so earlier. Most married women would prefer that their parents should be the more preferred heirs to inherit her property if her children and husband are not alive. She would also prefer that her sister and brother have a better right to inherit her property than her brother-in-law and sister-in-law.

Accordingly, it is urged that Section 15(1) should be modified to ensure that the general order of succession does not place a woman’s husband’s heirs above those who belong to her natal family like her father and mother and thereafter, her brother and sister. It is contended that when a man dies intestate, his wife’s relatives do not even figure in the order of succession despite the manner in which he may have acquired the property. In view of this, parity is sought in the case of a female by applying the same rules as applicable to male’s property.

Accordingly, it is suggested that it would be better to amend Section 15(1) to specify the general rules of devolution, which will apply not only to self-acquired property by a woman, but also to other property acquired through her family, gifts, etc. The only proviso which would then be needed would be the property that a woman acquires from her husband’s family.

The second option in this regard is that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate devolves upon the heirs depending upon the source from which, the said property was acquired by her, the self-acquired property of such female be simultaneously inherited by her heirs both from the husband family as well as the natal family in equal share. The fact remains that in spite of her closeness to and dependence on her natal family, her relations with her husband’s family are not separated and uprooted in entirety. She continues to be a member of her husband’s family, getting support from it in all walks of life. One cannot afford to ignore the ground realities in this regard. The social ethos and the mores of our patriarchal system demand that the existing system should not be totally reversed as claimed by the protagonists of the first option. Lest, there may be social and family tensions which may not be in the overall interest of the family as a whole and as such, ought to be avoided. In any case, it is open to the female Hindu to bequeath her property the way she likes by executing a Will.

Conclusions

In the present scenario, when amendments are made to the effect that women have been entitled to inherit property from her parental side as well as from husband’s side, it will be quite justified if equal right is given to her parental heirs along with her husband’s heirs to inherit her property.

It is, therefore, proposed that in order to bring about a balance, Section 15 should be amended, so that in case a female Hindu dies intestate leaving her self-acquired property with no heirs, as mentioned in Clause ‘a’ of Section 15, the property should devolve on her husband’s heirs and also on the heirs of her paternal side.

If this amendment is brought about, the effect will be as under:

A married Hindu female dies intestate leaving self-acquired property at the time of her death, the only surviving relatives being her mother-in-law (L) and her mother (M).

Pre-Amendment

As per the present law, her property would devolve entirely on ‘L’ and ‘M’ will not get anything from her property.

Post Amendment

By the proposed amendment, her mother-in-law and mother should equally inherit her self-acquired property.

A married Hindu female dies intestate leaving self-acquired property and she has no heirs as per Clause ‘a’ of the Schedule, the only surviving relatives are her husband’s brother and sister (BL & SL) and her own brother and sister (B&S).

Pre-Amendment

As per the present law, her property would normally devolve upon ‘BL’ and ‘SL’. ‘B’ and ‘S’ do not inherit anything from her in this property.

Post Amendment

By the proposed amendment, her own brother and sister should equally inherit along with her brother-in-law and sister-in-law.

The above amendment, suggested by me as Chairman of 18 {+t} {+h} Law Commission as early as in June 2008 in the public interest, is still pending with the Union Law Ministry.

(The writer is a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India and former Chairman, Law Commission of India. His email id is jusarlakshmanan@ gmail.com)

Section 15 should be amended, so that in case a female Hindu dies intestate leaving her self-acquired property with no heirs, as mentioned in Clause ‘a’ of Section 15, the property should devolve on her husband’s heirs and also on the heirs of her paternal side.

Lawyers can practise in all courts soon: Veerappa Moily

Posted in COURTS, LAWYERS by NNLRJ INDIA on June 5, 2011

J VENKATESAN

Section 30 of Advocates Act will be notified 50 years after Act came into force

Fifty years after the Advocates Act, 1961, was enacted, the Centre has decided to notify Section 30 of this Act to enable advocates to practise as a matter of right in all courts, tribunals or any quasi-judicial authority.

This provision was not notified when the Act came into force.

Union Law Minister Veerappa Moily told The Hindu that the long-pending demands of the lawyers had been conceded, and he had passed appropriate orders for notifying this Section early next week.

Section 30 of the Advocates Act says: “Right of advocates to practice: Subject to the provisions of this Act, every advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends; in all courts including the Supreme Court; before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practice.”

Mr. Moily said: “I traced the file relating to this provision. For some reasons this Section remained in the Statute without being notified. I decided to notify this Section and signed necessary orders. The notification is expected to be issued either on June 7 or 8.”

Expressing satisfaction over the progress in the implementation of ‘vision statement’ launched in October 2009, he said under the programme to be launched from July 1, about 40 per cent of the petty cases pending in various courts were to be disposed of in six months through Lok Adalats and morning/evening courts.

He said the 13th Finance Commission provided Rs. 5,000 crore for support to the judiciary and the first instalment of Rs. 1,000 crore had already been released for 2010-2011. The Finance Commission envisaged that all subordinate courts could have extended court hours by hiring retired judges or giving allowances to incumbent judges to dispose of petty cases.

Such courts, he said, were to be established at a cost of Rs. 3.5 lakh each and they were expected to dispose of 225 lakh minor cases annually. In addition Lok Adalats were expected to dispose of 15 lakh a year and by 2015, a total of 75 lakh cases would be disposed of by Lok Adalats.

Mr. Moily said he had written to the Chief Justices of various High Courts underlining the need for reducing the pendency of cases in courts from 15 to three years by 2012. He said he had asked the CJs to launch the campaign from July by fixing targets and types of cases for disposal.

He had suggested to them to follow summary procedure as allowed by law, plea bargaining and compounding of cases to reduce the caseload in courts.

On the progress in computerisation of courts, he said: “The government is implementing a Central sector scheme for computerisation of the District and subordinate courts [e-courts project] in the country and for upgradation of the Information and Communication Technology infrastructure of the Supreme Court and High Courts including video-conferencing facilities.”

The truth should come out. What did the Chief Justice of India do when a High Court Judge was threatened by a Minister?

Posted in CONSTITUTION, JUDICIARY, JUSTICE by NNLRJ INDIA on December 9, 2010
Konakuppakatil Gopinathan Balakrishnan, Chief ...

Image via Wikipedia

Balakrishnan: I did not receive any letter from Regupathi when I was CJI

FROM THE HINDU

“Such reports cast aspersions on me, that I had committed dereliction of duty”

NEW DELHI: National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) chairman K.G. Balakrishnan on Wednesday denied reports in a section of the media that the former Madras High Court Judge, Justice R. Reghupathi, had written to him when he was the Chief Justice of India (CJI) alleging that the former Union Telecom Minister, A. Raja, had tried to influence him. Justice Balakrishnan also denied that he had suppressed that letter.

“Incorrect”

“Such reports cast aspersions on me, that I had committed dereliction of duty… The allegations are absolutely incorrect,” he said in a statement here. Justice Balakrishnan made it clear that he had not received any such letter or communication directly from Justice Reghupathi while he was in office.

Gokhale’s report sought

When the media reported the incident, at that time Justice Balakrishnan sought a report from the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, H.L. Gokhale, and the latter sent him a report wherein nothing was mentioned about the name of any Union Minister having talked over phone with Justice Reghupathi to influence him. “Therefore, there was no occasion for me to talk to the Prime Minister or to take any further action.”

‘Facts disclosed’

Justice Balakrishnan said he had disclosed these facts at the relevant time. “Moreover, if anything happened like that, which amounted to interference in the judicial function of Justice Reghupathi, he himself could have exercised his powers of contempt of court for which no permission is required from the CJI.”

‘Facts can be verified’

“It appeared that Justice Reghupathi made a statement that he reported the matter to the Chief Justice and he certainly meant the [then] Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and not the CJI,” Justice Balakrishnan said, adding that these facts may be verified.

The letter, which was written to him by Justice Gokhale, might be available in the office of the present Chief Justice, Justice Balakrishnan said.

Regupathi says he did mark a copy to CJI

Mohamed Imranullah S.IN THE HINDU

MADURAI: The former Madras High Court judge, R. Regupathi, on Wednesday said that he had written a letter on July 2, 2009 to the then Chief Justice of the High Court, regarding the attempt to influence him in an anticipatory bail case, with a “specific endorsement to forward the copy to the [then] Chief Justice of India” (CJI) K.G. Balakrishnan.

Speaking to The Hindu on the phone, Justice Regupathi said he did not make sure whether the letter reached the CJI or not because “if I had followed it up closely, people would have attributed motives against me. In fact, I avoided meeting the CJI after that even though he had come to the judicial academy in Chennai and I too visited the Supreme Court to meet my lawyer friends.”

He gave two reasons for not initiating suo motu contempt proceedings against the individuals concerned. “Firstly, the issue was so big and the person involved was the Chairman of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu. If I had initiated contempt, then I would have been holding my own brief. At times, judges may also commit mistakes. So I was careful in not dealing with the issue myself. Secondly, I thought it appropriate that some other judge should hear the matter. Therefore, I passed a judicial order requesting the Chief Justice of the High Court to transfer the case to another Bench. Coupled with it, I also addressed a letter to him on the administrative side. Being a sensitive issue, I was very careful and I am still sure I made the right decision,” he said.

“Once a judge delivers a judgment, he becomes ‘ functus officio’ [having performed his office]. Therefore, I made my decision that the matter should be handled my some other judge and put down everything in writing to the head of the institution and left the matter at that. “Having been a criminal lawyer for nearly 30 years, I know that this was the right way to deal with such issues,” he added.

http://www.hindu.com/2010/12/09/stories/2010120955981400.htm

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD – RAM JANAM BHOOMI BABRI MASJID VERDICT OF THE FULL BENCH OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Posted in JUDICIARY, JUSTICE by NNLRJ INDIA on October 1, 2010
Coram :-

Hon’ble Sibghat Ullah Khan ,J.

Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.

Hon’ble Dharam Veer Sharma, J.

Gist of Judgements :-
Hon’ble Sibghat Ullah Khan ,J.

Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.

Hon’ble Dharam Veer Sharma, J.
Brief summary
Issues for briefing

JUDGEMENT/ ORDERS

Case Details
1. Other Original Suit No. 1 of 1989 Gopal Singh Visharad (Now Dead) & Others
Vs.
Zahoor Ahmad & Others
2. Other Original Suit No. 3 of 1989 Nirmohi Akhara & Others
Vs.
Baboo Priya Dutt Ram and Others
3. Other Original Suit No. 4 of 1989 The Sunni Central Board of Waqfs U.P.& Others
Vs.
Gopal Singh Visharad (Now Dead) & Others.
4. Other Original Suit No. 5 of 1989 Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman and Others
Vs.
Rajendra Singh and Others

JUDGEMENT ORDERS

Judgments Per
Hon’ble Sibghat Ullah Khan ,J. Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J. Hon’ble Dharam Veer Sharma, J.
Consolidated Judgment in
OOS No. 1 of 1989,
OOS No. 3 of 1989,
OOS No. 4 of 1989 &
OOS No. 5 of 1989
Consolidated Judgment in
OOS No. 1 of 1989,
OOS No. 3 of 1989,
OOS No. 4 of 1989 &
OOS No. 5 of 1989
Vol 1 Judgment in OOS No. 1 of 1989
– do – Vol 2 Judgment in OOS No. 3 of 1989
– do – Vol 3 Judgment in
OOS No. 4 of 1989
Vol 1
– do – Vol 4 Judgment in
OOS No. 4 of 1989
Vol 2
– do – Vol 5 Judgment in
OOS No. 4 of 1989
Vol 3
– do – Vol 6 Judgment in
OOS No. 4 of 1989
Vol 4
– do – : Vol 7 Judgment in OOS No. 5 of 1989
– do – Vol 8 Index of Annexure – I to III
– do – : Vol 9 Annexure – I
– do – Vol 10 Annexure – II
– do – Vol 11 Annexure – III
– do – Vol 12 Page wise Index of Annexure IV
– do – Vol 13 Annexure IV – Page 1 to 125
– do – Vol 14 Annexure IV – Page 126 to 128
– do – Vol 15 Annexure IV – Page 129 to 162
– do – Vol 16 Page wise Index of Annexure V
– do – Vol 17 Annexure V – Page 1 to 14
– do – Vol 18 Annexure V – Page 15 to 59
– do – Vol 19 Annexure V – Page 60 to 117
– do – Vol 20 Annexure V – Page 112A
– do – Vol 21* Annexure V – Page 118 to 189
Annexure V – Page 190 to 220
Annexure V – Page 221 to 281

//

*Vol 21 Per Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal J. includes :
1. Appendix 8 : General Index
2. Appendix 9 : Citation Index
3. Appendix 10 : Reference Book Index

THE AYODHYA JUDGEMENT VERDICT / ORDERS – RAM JANAMBHOOMI – BABRI MASJID ORDER OF THE LUCKNOW BENCH OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Posted in JUDICIARY, JUSTICE by NNLRJ INDIA on September 30, 2010

The Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court on Thursday ruled by a majority verdict that the disputed land at Ayodhya would be jointly held by Hindus, Muslims and the Nirmohi Akhara.

Holding the disputed site was the birthplace of Lord Ram, the majority on the Bench said that each party – the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sunni Waqf Board and the Nirmohi Akhara — would be entitled to one-third share of the disputed land, with Lord Ram’s idol continuing to stay at the place where he was placed.In their separate judgements on the sensitive 60-year old title dispute on Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid structure, Justices S U Khan and Sudhir Agarwal said the area under the central dome of the three-domed structure where Lord Ram’s idol exists belongs to Hindus.Justices Khan and Agarwal decreed that the 2.7 acre land comprising the disputed site should be divided into three equal parts and be given to the Sunni Waqf Board, Nirmohi Akhara and the party representing ‘Ram Lala Virajman’ (Ram deity).

THE JUDGEMENT ARE ENCLOSED BELOW

GIST OF HONOBLE JUSTICE AGGARWAL JUDGEMENT -LUCKNOW BENCH OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

GIST OF HONOBLE JUSTICE S U KHAN JUDGEMENT – LUCKNOW BENCH OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Brief Summary AYODHYA DISPUTE – LUCKNOW BENCH OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Issues of Briefing – AYODHYA DISPUTE – LUCKNOW BENCH OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

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