Wail of zamindars

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A.G. NOORANI in FRONTLINE

 Ministers involved in sports bodies oppose the Sports Development Bill. Sharad Pawar sees it as an attempt to bring the BCCI under the RTI.

THE organised wails and breast-beating of members of the Union Cabinet holding high offices in sports bodies, at the Cabinet meeting on August 30, reminds one of a similar spectacle enacted by Zamindars over half a century ago, when Bills for abolition of the Zamindari system were introduced in State legislatures. This time the tamasha was over the National Sports Development Bill, 2011, which Minister for Sports and Youth Affairs Ajay Maken tabled for discussion in the Cabinet.

The strongest opposition came from Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar, who threatened to take up the matter with the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) chairperson Sonia Gandhi and ask her to discuss it in the UPA coordination committee: “[T]ell [ sic] her to allow me to follow my party’s decision during the voting on the Bill” ( The Times of India, August 31). The confidence with which he anticipated the decision of his party, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), says a lot for that party and for him.

The shrillest of the mourners was Farooq Abdullah. As has been pointed out earlier in this journal, citing authoritative dicta by constitutional authorities, Ministers who are affected personally by a proposed measure have absolutely no right to be present at the Cabinet meeting that is to discuss the measure. The vice is not cured one bit by “disclosure of interest”, quite apart from the fact that the interest was only too well known. (“A flawed waiver”, Frontline, May 6, 2011). Rule 255 of the Rules of Procedure of the Lok Sabha provides that if a member of a committee of Parliament has a “personal” or “direct interest” on a matter to be discussed, he shall, on the Speaker’s finding to that effect, “ cease to be member thereof forthwith”.

In 1937, Sir John Simon reiterated the rules on behalf of the Prime Minister:

“In the first place, it is plain that in no circumstances must a man who holds the position of a Minister ever allow himself to be in such a situation that his public duty will conflict with his private interests…. The second principle is that no man should allow himself to occupy any portion of the time which he is bound to devote to his public duties in a disregard of his public duties, and pursuing any private interest whatever, whether it is in playing golf or in the nature of business.

“The third principle is that inasmuch as the secrets of the government are specially in charge of Cabinet Ministers, no Minister, and particularly no Cabinet Minister, must in any circumstances put himself in a position where he is not able to be the complete guardian of those secrets in that there is any possibility of any private interests being served through a knowledge of those secrets” (324-C. Debates Ss., 1220).

What is the lure of power over sports bodies that drives politicians to seek that power while grasping simultaneously at state power? In this category fall also Praful Patel, Vilasrao Deshmukh, C.P. Joshi, Farooq Abdullah and Arun Jaitley.

Regardless of their protests, the Bill must be considered objectively. Control of sports bodies by politicians is offensive; more so is state Control. Involved are two distinct issues. One is the application of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005, to the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). The other comprises regulatory measures over all national sports federations, including the BCCI. They are: a 70-year age bar and a 12-year tenure limit on office-bearers of the federations and the BCCI, a 25 per cent reservation of seats on their executive boards for sportsmen of the same game, anti-doping norms, provision for “recognition” of the federations (BCCI included) by the Government of India and the publication of audited accounts. Clause 6(1) of the Bill reads thus: “Every national sports federation shall, in collaboration with the Sports Authority of India (SAI) and with the approval of the Central Government, develop a long-term development plan for a period of four years.”

Heavy Industries Minister Praful Patel’s objection is valid: “If such a Bill is passed, bureaucrats like a Joint Secretary will be soon running the sports federation. What is their competence in sports administration? The Sports Ministry should rather address the issue of free and fair elections in sports bodies.”

The Sports Minister replies: “Section 6(1) Clause only relates to those federations which are funded by the government. After all, the Ministry has a right to see how its funds are utilised. But the provision is not applicable for bodies like the BCCI, which does not take grant-in-aid from the government” ( Indian Express, September 1).

For all the furore, there is considerable common ground between the rival viewpoints and, therefore, ample ground for compromise. Note these pronouncements. Sports Minister Ajay Maken said: “Whichever provision that sports federations find intrusive, we are willing to look into it. Our intention is not to control the national sports federations but to regulate them. We do not intend to be intrusive.”

Praful Patel said he did not have any issue with opening the BCCI to RTI scrutiny, adding that this was his personal view. Patel, who heads the All India Football Federation (AIFF), however, said he had objections to only specific provisions and not to the entire draft Bill per se. “Personally, I don’t have any issues with RTI [for BCCI]. But I do not agree with the clauses relating to age bar, tenure limitation and control of sporting bodies by the government.”

A provision of the draft Bill says: “Every national sports federation (this includes the BCCI) shall every year before December 21 publish on its website audited annual financial statements, comprehensive report of its activities and achievements.” What objection can any sports federation possibly have to such a provision? Sports federations, the BCCI included, select national teams for participation in matches abroad.

In the very nature of things, there has to be a certain liaison between the state and the federations. The BCCI is accepted internationally only because it is seen internationally to enjoy a measure of official backing and support. Without these its clout would dissipate. We have to steer between the Scylla of politicians’ corrupting control and the Charybdis of state control, which will cripple sports.

Some legislation is overdue. One must consider first the legal status of the BCCI and, relatedly, its behaviour. There are four rulings on its status. One is by the Delhi High Court. The other three are by the Supreme Court: (1) BCCI vs Netaji Cricket Club and Ors. (2005) 4 Supreme Court Case 741 decided by Justices N. Santosh Hegde and S.B. Sinha on January 10, 2005. Only a few days later, on February 2, 2005, they split; each pronouncing for the differing judges (3-2), a narrow majority, in (2) Zee.Telefilms Ltd & Anr vs Union India & Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 649, and, lastly, (3) A.C. Muthiah vs BCCI & Anr (2011) 6 SCC 617 decided on April 28, 2011, by Justices J.M. Panchal and Gyan Sudha Misra. They differed and referred the matter to the Chief Justice of India “for being assigned to an appropriate Bench”. Thus, despite the three cases, the issue of the BCCI’s status remains to be decided finally, one hopes by a larger Bench. The final result is unlikely to please the zamindars of the BCCI, judging by the reasoning of the eminent judges who ruled on the issue. It is best to quote their words at some length.

BCCI’s status

Part III of the Constitution, embodying the Fundamental Rights, applies only to “the state”, not to private individuals or associations. Article 12 defines what “the state” means in this context. It covers the Central and State governments and legislatures and “all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India”. The Supreme Court interpreted Article 12 to cover a host of bodies so that the citizen can enforce his fundamental rights against them. Is the BCCI a state so defined? The BCCI was formed in 1928, as an unregistered association of persons. It was registered in 1940 under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a Central statute. It was later registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, which came into effect on April 22, 1978.

The first case ( BCCI vs Netaji Cricket Club) concerned elections for the post of the BCCI’s president. Netaji Club was a member of the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association (TNCA), which, in turn, was a member of the BCCI. The judgment was delivered by Justice S.B. Sinha of the two-judge Bench. Justice Santosh Hegde was party to it. It said:

“The Board is a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. It enjoys a monopoly status as regards regulation of the sport of cricket in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. It controls the sport of cricket and lays down the law therefor. It inter alia enjoys benefits by way of tax exemption and right to use stadia at nominal annual rent. It earns a huge revenue not only by selling tickets to viewers but also selling right to exhibit films live on TV and broadcasting the same. Ordinarily, its full members are the State associations except Association of Indian Universities, Railway Sports Control Board and Services Sports Control Board. As a member of ICC [International Cricket Council], it represents the country in the international fora. It exercises enormous public functions. It has the authority to select players, umpires and other officers. The Rules of the Board clearly demonstrate that without its recognition no competitive cricket can be hosted either within or outside the country. Its control over the sport of competitive cricket is deeply pervasive and complete.

“In law, there cannot be any dispute that having regard to the enormity of power exercised by it the Board is bound to follow the doctrine of ‘fairness’ and ‘good faith’ in all its activities. Having regard to the fact that it has to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of millions, it has a duty to act reasonably. It cannot act arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously. As the Board controls the profession of cricket, its actions are required to be judged and viewed by higher standards.”

Zee Telefilms Ltd vs Union of India was decided by a Bench of five judges. It squarely concerned the issue whether the BCCI fell within the definition of “the state” in Article 12. The Bench split narrowly. Justice Santosh Hegde delivered the judgment for himself and Justices B. Singh and H.K. Sema, while Justice S.B. Sinha delivered the dissent on his own behalf and on behalf of Justice S.N. Variava.

Admittedly, the BCCI is neither controlled by the government nor does it receive financial assistance from it. The majority ruled that it was not an instrumentality of the state. The government’s plea that it enjoyed it “ de facto recognition” was rejected. But the majority qualified this:

“However, it is true that the Union of India has been exercising certain control over the activities of the Board in regard to organising cricket matches and travel of the Indian team abroad as also granting of permission to allow the foreign teams to come to India. But this control over the activities of the Board cannot be construed as an administrative control. At best this is purely regulatory in nature and the same according to this court in [the] Pradeep Kumar Biswas case is not a factor indicating a pervasive state control of the Board.

“Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to public duties or state functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or she is not a state. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than Article 32.” The gap between this view and the minority view is not wide.

Article 226 confers on High Courts power to issue “to any person or authority” and “any government” writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights “and for any other purpose”. Article 32 empowers only the Supreme Court to issue writs for the enforcements of the fundamental rights. The majority very well knew that the Supreme Court has driven a coach-and-four through Article 32. It has issued writs for all manner of purposes. It would be unsafe for the BCCI to bank on the majority view with its explicit recognition that the BCCI does exercise “ public duties or state functions”. How then can it object to Central legislation?

Justice Sinha’s dissent focuses on this very point, the BCCI’s Achilles’ heel. He said: “Its actions of promoting the sport, making laws for cricket for the entire country, representing the country in international forums, appointing India’s representatives, and the all-pervasive control over players, managers and umpires are state actions.” He cited an English ruling that said: “The reason why a club is not subject to judicial review is not just because it is self-regulating. The panel wields enormous power. It has a giant’s strength. The fact that it is self-regulating, which means, presumably, that it is not subject to regulation by others, and in particular the Department of Trade and Industry, makes it not less but more appropriate that it should be subject to judicial review by the courts.”

Justice Sinha observed: “The Board [BCCI] while enjoying monopoly in cricket exercises enormous power, which is neither in doubt nor in dispute. Its action may disable a person from pursuing his vocation and in that process subject a citizen to hostile discrimination or impose an embargo which would make or mar a player’s career. The right to pursue an occupation or the right of equality are embedded in our Constitution, whereby citizens of India are granted much higher right as compared to the common law right in England. A body although self-regulating, if it performs a public duty by way of exercise of regulatory machinery a judicial review would lie against it. The question has since been considered from a slightly different angle, viz., when such action affects the human right of the person concerned holding that the same would be public function. If the action of the Board impinges upon the fundamental or other constitutional rights of a citizen or if the same is ultra vires or by reason thereof an injury or material prejudice is caused to its member or a person connected with cricket, judicial review would lie. Such functions on the part of the Board being public functions, any violation of or departure or deviation from abiding by the Rules and Regulations framed by it would be subject to judicial review. Time is not far off when having regard to globalisation and privatisation the rules of administrative law have to be extended to private bodies whose functions affect the fundamental rights of a citizen and who wield a great deal of influence in public life.” The logic is unanswerable.

Justice Sinha pointed out: “The traditional tests of a body controlled financially, functionally and administratively by the government as laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas would have application only when a body is created by the state itself for different purposes but incorporated under the Indian Companies Act or the Societies Registration Act. Those tests may not be applicable in a case where the body like the Board was established as a private body long time back. It was allowed by the state to represent the state or the country in international fora. It became a representative body of the international organisations as representing the country. The nature of function of such a body becomes such that having regard to the enormity thereof it acquires the status of monopoly for all practical purposes; regulates and controls the fundamental rights of a citizen as regards his right of speech or right of occupation, becomes representative of the country either overtly or covertly and has a final say in the matter of registration of players, umpires and others connected with a very popular sport. The organisers of competitive Test cricket between one association and another or representing different states or different organisations having the status of state are allowed to make laws on the subject, which is essentially a state function in terms of Entry 33 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In such a case, different tests have to be applied.”

Recognised body

The BCCI selects India’s Team, not the BCCI’s team. “As per ICC Rules and Guidelines for Classification of Official Cricket, the definition of a Test match in clause 1(a)(i) is as follows: ‘Any cricket match of not more than five days scheduled duration played between two teams selected by full members as representatives of their member countries and accorded the status of Test match by the Council.’ Indisputably, the Union of India had issued guidelines, which had been reviewed from time to time. The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports issued the revised guidelines and forwarded the same to the presidents/ Secretary General, Indian Olympic Association, and presidents/ hon. general secretaries of all recognised sports federations, incorporating therein the amended provisions. Cricket is included in annexure I within the category.”

Justice Sinha proceeded to analyse the government’s guidelines. “Annexure II appended to the guidelines provides for recognition of national sports federations, inter alia, by laying down the eligibility therefor and the necessity of filling of applications in that behalf. Clause 3, 12, reads as under: ‘There would be only one recognised federation for each discipline of sport, irrespective of the fact that the particular sport caters to youngsters, men, women or veterans.

‘However, this condition shall not apply to federations already recognised by the Department.’ Clause 5 provides for grant of recognition. Annexure III appended to the said guidelines provides for the procedure for suspension/withdrawal of recognition and consequences thereof. The guidelines also prescribe forms required to be used by the federations for different purposes.

“The Board for all intent and purport was a recognised body. Probably in that view of the matter, the Board did not think it necessary to apply for grant of such recognition by the Union of India, asking it for passing a formal order. However, the Board had all along been obtaining the requisite permission for sending an Indian team abroad or for inviting a foreign team to India in the prescribed form. …a number of documents have been annexed, which clearly go to show that from the very beginning the Board had been asking for the permission of the Ministry of Human Resource Development either to go abroad or to play or participate in other countries or for inviting the others to play in India. Such permission had been sought for in the form prescribed in terms of the said Regulations. The said documents leave no manner of doubt that the Board had asked for and the Union of India had granted de facto recognition.” So much for the objection to the government’s power of “recognition”.

“It is not disputed that the Union of India has not recognised any other national sports body for regulating the game of cricket in India. It is the categorical stand of the Union of India that only by such recognition granted by the Union of India is the team selected by the Board the Indian cricket team, which it could not do in the absence thereof. We cannot accept the submission of Mr Venugopal to the effect that even while playing abroad, the Board sends its own team. It is evident from the records, which fact has also been noticed by the Delhi High Court in its judgment in Rahul Mehra, that the Board fields its team as the Indian team and not as Board Eleven, which without having any authority from the Union of India it will not be able to do. The stand that the cricket team selected by the Board only represents it and not the country is incorrect. Having regard to the Rules of the ICC, its own Rules as also various documents placed before this court by the Union of India, the conduct of both the Board and the Union of India clearly goes to show that sub silentio both the parties had been acting on the premise that the Board is recognised as the only recognised national federation for the purpose of regulating the game of cricket in India.”

Read this: “A body which carries on the monopolistic function of selecting a team to represent the nation and whose core function is to promote a sport that has become a symbol of national identity and the medium of expression of national pride, must be held to be carrying out governmental functions. A highly arbitrary or capricious action on the part of such a powerful body would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Board itself acted as a representative of the Government of India before the international community. It makes representations to the effect that it was entitled to select a team which represents the nation as a cricket-playing country, and, thus, the same would, without anything more, make its action a state action. For the said purpose, actual control of the Board or issuing any direction in that behalf by the Government of India is not of much significance, but the question as to whether the government, considering the facts and circumstances, should control the actions of the Board as long as it purports to select a team to represent India would be a matter of great significance.

“The guidelines issued by the Union of India clearly demonstrate its concern with the fall in standard of Indian teams in sports in important international sports events. It would not be correct to draw a comparison between an event of international sport as significant as cricket with beauty pageants and other such events as the test necessary to be evolved in this behalf is the qualitative test and not the quantitative test. The quality and character of a sport recognised as a measure of education and nation-building (as a facet of human resource development) cannot be confused with an event that may be a form of entertainment. Cricket, as noticed hereinbefore, has a special place in the hearts of citizens of India.

“The monopoly status of the Board is undisputed. The monopoly enjoyed by the Board need not be a statutory one so as to conform to the tests contained in Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. It can be a de facto monopoly which has overtly or covertly received the blessings of the Union of India. The de facto monopoly of the Board is manifest as it, as a member of ICC (even if it is technically possible to float any other association), can send an Indian team abroad or invite a foreign team to India. In the absence of recognition from the ICC, it would not be possible for any other body, including the Union of India, to represent India in the international cricket events featuring competitive cricket….

“The Board which represents a nation with or without a statutory flavour has duties to perform towards the players, coaches, umpires, administrators and other team officials. They have a duty to create safe rules for the sport, if by reason thereof a physical injury to the player is to be avoided and to keep safety aspect under ongoing review. A body may be autonomous but with autonomy comes responsibility. Sport is a ‘good thing’ wherefor a societal end is to be provided. Sport must receive encouragement from the state and the general public or at least not be discouraged. Health, sociability and play are considered to be important values to be recognised in a human.

“Having regard to the nature of activities, viz., the Board represents a sovereign country while selecting and fielding a team for the country with another sovereign country, promoting and aiming at good relations with the said country as also peace and prosperity for the people, even at the domestic level the citizens of the said country may be held to be entitled to the right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court even if hereby no personal fundamental right is directly infringed.

“With the opening up of the economy and globalisation, more and more governmental functions are being performed and showed to be performed by private bodies. When the functions of a body are identifiable with the state functions, they would be state actors only in relation thereto… What is necessary is to find out as to whether by reason of its nature of activities, the functions of the Board are public functions. It regulates and controls the field of cricket to the exclusion of others; its activities impinge upon the fundamental rights of the players and other persons as also the rights, hopes and aspirations of the cricket-loving public. The right to see the game of cricket live or on television also forms an important facet of the Board. A body which makes a law for sports in India (which otherwise is the function of the state), conferring upon itself not only enormous powers but also final say in disciplinary matters and, thus, being responsible for making or marring a citizen’s sports career, would be an authority which answers the description of ‘other authorities’.”

The third case arose out of a suit filed by A.C Muthiah, a former president of the BCCI, against the BCCI. It had invited Indian Cements Ltd., based at Chennai and represented by its managing director N. Srinivasan (respondent 2), to participate in the auction conducted by the Indian Premier League (IPL). Srinivasan was also the hon. treasurer of the BCCI and president of the TNCA. He was awarded the franchised IPL rights for ownership of Chennai Super Kings team by the BCCI. Muthiah alleged conflict of interest and filed a suit in the Madras High Court for various reliefs. Srinivasan participated in the Annual General Meeting of the BCCI held in Mumbai on September 27, 2008, since the court had not granted a temporary injunction. More, he was also elected secretary of the BCCI. On the same day, Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, etc., was amended with immediate effect to cover the plea of conflict of interest. It now read: “No administrator shall have directly or indirectly any commercial interest in the matches or events conducted by [the] BCCI excluding events like IPL or Champion League Twenty 20” (emphasis added, throughout).

Muthiah sued again to have the amendment declared void as being made mala fide. The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court. Justice Panchal not only held that the BCCI was not “the state” but opined in the teeth of the record that the Netaji Club case was “no longer good law” in view of the ruling in the Zee Telefilms case. There was nothing to prevent the Bench in the latter case from saying so. It had not. Indeed, Santosh Hegde’s remarks quoted above came very close to Justice Sinha’s.

Questionable amendment

Justice Gyan Sudha Misra disagreed with Justice Panchal completely, observing: “Just after a few days of filling of the suit by the plaintiff-appellant herein Shri Muthiah, wherein he sought to enforce the policy in Clause 6.2.4 against the second respondent Shri N. Srinivasan, BCCI met on 27-9-2008 and introduced an amendment to Clause 6.2.4 carving out an exception therein, which reads as follows: ‘No administrator shall have directly or indirectly any commercial interest in any of the events of BCCI excluding IPL, Champions League and Twenty 20.’ Thus, by one stroke of an amendment, which was introduced with racing speed, without any deliberation by BCCI, and without notice of 21 days to the members on this agenda, which was required under the Regulation, the most commercial event of BCCI, namely, IPL, Champions League and Twenty 20 matches, were excluded from Clause 6.2.4, diluting the entire effect of Clause 6.2.4, reducing this salutary clause into a dead letter.”

Two observations by Justice Misra deserve particular attention. “I also find sufficient force and substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that as BCCI discharges important public functions such as the selection of Indian Team and the control on the players and has to discharge important public functions, it cannot be expected to act arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously so as to hold that the two suits are not maintainable at the instance of the appellant, who, although admittedly is the past president of BCCI and hence an administrator, had no locus standi to file even a civil suit and seek order of injunction for suspending the effect of amendment on the plea that as he was not a member of the subcommittee he was not competent to challenge the amendment introduced in the BCCI Regulations.”

The judge added. “It is essential to highlight that the BCCI Regulation itself acknowledges this position when it lays down in Clause 6.2.4 that ‘no administrator shall have direct or indirect commercial interest in any events of BCCI’, but dilutes its effect by amending it and making IPL, Champions League and Twenty 20 matches as an exception which is the most lucrative and revenue generating event. If the administrator is clearly barred as per the Regulations from having any commercial interest in the events of BCCI, it is beyond my comprehension as to how only one class of matches, which was IPL, Twenty 20 and Champions League, could be treated as an exception by allowing an office-bearer to participate in the bid but preventing him from other matches including Test matches.”

More to the main point: “It would be difficult to overlook that multiple loyalties can create commercial interest with the activities of BCCI, thus resulting in conflict of interest since the financial or personal interest of the Board would clearly be inconsistent with the commercial and personal interest of the administrator of the Board. In addition, the rule of equity and fairness provides that no one who stands in a position of trust towards another can in matters affected by that position, advance his own interests, for example, by trading and making a profit at that other’s expense as the rule of legal prudence mandates that once a fiduciary is shown to be in breach of his duty of loyalty, he must disgorge any benefit gained even though he might have acted honestly and in his principal’s best interest. In the instant matter, when BCCI held auction for owning IPL team and an administrator, respondent 2, participated in the bid, variety of real and/or perceived conflict of interest cannot be ruled out. These included access to insider information, possible undue influence on the decision-makers who held the auction, and the like.” The BCCI was clearly guilty of gauche manoeuvre. This is not the conduct of one as pure as driven snow. The BCCI’s status and its conduct cry for legislation. The former’s uncertainty must be removed. Excesses like the latter must be curbed. The Jagmohan Dalmiya and Lalit Modi power struggles in the BCCI tell their own tale.

First the definition of “public authority” in Section 2 (h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 must be widened to include “any body which receives aid and assistance from the government whether by user of government-owned land for services, of a government agency”. To put the matter beyond doubt, the BCCI can be mentioned explicitly in this amendment – or in the proposed Bill.

Some genius in the Sports Ministry prepared an 81-page note for the Cabinet claiming that Parliament can legislate by invoking entries 10 and 13 of the Union List ( DNA, August 31). This is utterly false. These entries relate, respectively, to “foreign affairs” and “participation in international” fora. “Sports” is a State subject exclusively under Entry 33 of the State List. Equally wrong would it be to invoke Entry 25 in the Concurrent List on “education”, stretching it to cover sports despite its explicit mention in the State List. However Entry 63 of the Union List empowers Parliament to legislate in respect of any “institution declared by Parliament by law to be an institution of national importance”. The BCCI fits the Bill even more than the Indian Council of World Affairs for which it was invoked.

Even in the U.S., the haven of private enterprise, its Supreme Court propounded the doctrine that when “one devotes his property to a use in the public interest which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good” ( Munn vs Illinois 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). This is the doctrine of private utility affected by public interest. Legislative competence is beyond challenge. It is only right that the power should be exercised in a conciliatory spirit. There is and can be no issue as to the RTI. On the other points – age bar, tenure, etc. – the government must engage in quiet and earnest talks with the BCCI, other sports bodies, sportsmen of note and, indeed, the public at large.

The Times of India of September 7 carried this report by K. Shrinivas Rao:

“BCCI secretary N. Srinivasan has admitted before Parliament’s standing committee on finance that the Indian board needed to own up for financial irregularities in the Indian Premier League. Srinivasan said the BCCI could not cleaim exoneration simply by claiming that suspendd IPL chairman Lalit Modi was running the show. The BCCI had previously put the onus on Modi when it came to explaining lapses in expenditure during the first three editions of the IPL…. Maintaining that other senior officials had no idea of wrongdoings since Modi was given a free hand. The change in the BCCI’s stance is revealed in a recent report of the standing committee.”

N. Srinivasan is quoted in direct quotes: “I know we can’t plead before you that we did not know all this was happening. Your question would be, were you not vigilant? I am sorry, sir, there is no defence for me.”

In the face of all this, it would be a betrayal of the public interest to leave this rogue elephant at large.

Source: http://www.frontline.in/stories/20111007282004600.htm

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Enactment of a new legislation in place of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 – Introduction of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition ) Bill, 2011

The Union Cabinet today approved the proposal for the enactment of a new legislation in the form of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Bill, 2011 to replace the existing Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and for its introduction in Parliament. During the process of formulating the rules for implementing certain provisions of the present Act which was passed in 1988, it was found that owing to infirmities in the legislation, formulation of the rules would not be possible without a comprehensive legislation by repealing the Act. The Bill contains elaborate provisions dealing with the definition of benami transaction and benami property, prohibited benami transactions, consequences of entering into a prohibited benami transaction and the procedure for implementing the benami law. Properties held by a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and property held by a person in fiduciary capacity are excluded from the definition of benami transaction. Further, properties acquired by an individual in the name of spouse, brother or sister or any lineal ascendant or descendant are benami transactions which are not prohibited. Consequently, they are not subject to penal provisions.

Where any person enters into a benami transaction in order to defeat the provisions of any law or to avoid payment of statutory dues or to avoid payment to creditors, the beneficial owner, benamidar and any other person who abets or induces any person to enter into such benami transaction, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to a fine. A benami property shall also be liable for confiscation by the Adjudicating Authority after the person concerned has been given due opportunity of being heard.

Background:

The major infirmities of the existing Act were:

  1. Powers of a civil court have to be conferred on the authorities under the Act.
  2. Specific provisions have to be introduced for vesting of confiscated property with the Central Government.
  3. An appropriate appellate structure has to be defined, while barring jurisdiction of a civil court against an action taken by the authorities under the Act.
  4. Matters of procedure relating to its administration, notice of hearing to parties concerned, service of notice and orders, powers of the competent authority relating to gathering of evidence etc are to be provided.
  5. The word ‘wife’ needs to be replaced with the word ‘spouse’ and property purchased in the name of certain other family members is to be allowed under the Act.

A case of judicial inaction

The supreme court of india. Taken about 170 m ...

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BY RAJEEV DHAWAN , IN THE MAIL TODAY

IT ALL started on May 19, 2008, with the murder of V. Jayaraman of Pondicherry, who exposed a University marksheet scam. A Central Bureau of Investigation inquiry indicted a student named Sridharan and his father, C. Krishnamurthy who applied for bail in May 2009 which was before Justice R. Reghupathi. Then, impropriety broke loose. Allegedly, lawyer R. K. Chandramohan met Justice Reghupathi in his chambers in the Madras High Court on June 12, 2009, inviting him to speak to ‘ minister Raja’ over the telephone to let the accused father and son off.

Justice Reghupathi refused to oblige. By June 29, the matter became newsworthy when Chandramohan was reported to have upset court proceedings. Reported in a national daily the next day, the imbroglio stood exposed. Justice Reghupathi himself announced in open court on him being approached by a lawyer on behalf of a Union minister.

Raja

It was certainly the duty of Justice Reghupathi to report the matter to Chief Justice H. L. Gokhale of the Madras High Court. This he did on July 2, 2009. Sadly, Justice Gokhale who could have constituted a bench and issued a notice for contempt to the advocate through whom the minister’s name would have come out did not do so. Instead, Justice Gokhale wrote a letter on July 5, 2009, to the then Chief Justice of India K. G. Balakrishnan, which was dispatched on July 7 with his own covering letter which was duly acknowledged by CJI Balakrishnan. As it happens, the CJI did nothing, taking the view that there was nothing to act on! Subsequently, some action was taken to suspend lawyer Chandramohan.

Difficult though it is to believe, the then chief justices of Madras and India failed to take appropriate action. This total failure on the part of the judiciary does not do it credit. These acts of judicial forbearance would have died a natural death but for the fact that Minister Raja was in the news over the 2G spectrum scam. Media memory is stronger when triggered by whip- lash revivals. The matter resurfaced in December 2010 after 18 months of inaction.

The connecting point was the result of a Public Interest Litigation ( PIL) before the Madras High Court which ruled that action be taken to suspend lawyer Chandramohan. Wounds healed by judicial nonfeasance amounting to misfeasance were reopened. Retired Justice Reghupathi cannot be blamed for inconsistency. In retirement, faced with the new situation, he confirmed not only what he had said in open court in June 2009, but that he had sent everything to CJ Gokhale who had transmitted it to CJI Balakrishnan.

What happened next was an ex- post facto judicial ‘ blame- game’ between the two Chief Justices. On December 14, 2010, Chief Justice Gokhale, now a sitting judge of the Supreme Court, decided to contradict former CJI Balakrishnan who, according to Gokhale had “ given erroneous impression of my ( Gokhale’s) role in the matter.” A press release by a sitting SC Judge against a former CJI is unprecedented.

But its contents were illuminating. He said the former CJI knew from paragraph two of Reghupathi’s letter that Raja was the erring Minister. CJI Balakrishnan also wrote back to apprise CJ Gokhale of parliamentary concern addressed to the Prime Minister. Gokhale did nothing except to affirm that he had already sent Reghupathi’s letter to the CJI. In a sense, CJ Gokhale can be read to confirm that he failed to take appropriate action.

In December 2010, a controversy bordering on farce erupted between Gokhale and Balakrishnan, with Gokhale insisting that the former CJI knew that Raja was the minister in question, Balakrishnan denying this and Reghupathi thanking Gokhale. But whether Balakrishnan knew whether the Minister involved was Raja is mostly irrelevant.

Issues

Four issues stand out. The first is that the controversy was in the public domain. Everyone knew about it. The Prime Minister, parliamentarians, the two Chief Justices, the Madras Bar and, through the media, the general public. The two Chief Justices could have acted but failed to do so. CJ Gokhale was directly armed with the power to issue notices for contempt. CJI Balakrishnan could have used the Nadiad ruling to issue notices or prompted CJ Gokhale to do so. The controversy was allowed to lie fallow by the combined inaction of both Chief Justices. Second, Justice Reghupathi had declared what happened in Court and informed CJ Gokhale. He could not have constituted a contempt bench. That was for CJ Gokhale to do.

Third, CJ Gokhale should have issued notices for contempt. He, and — in some sense — only he had the power and jurisdiction to do so. He need not have passed the buck on to CJI Balakrishnan. But that was easier for him because, presumably, he did not want to ruffle the feathers of the Madras Bar of which lawyer Chandramohan was the President. Any controversy may have blighted his chance for a Supreme Court appointment. Clearly Gokhale’s abnegation does not seem worthy of a Chief Justice even if hitherto, he had a relatively colourless judicial career. Fourth comes CJI Balakrishnan who though from Kerala, was also a former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court with connections in the city. The issue was important enough for him to act.

His forbearance is astonishing. For him now to say that he did not know that Raja was involved is ducking the hook. In terms of his overall responsibility, this was irrelevant. At best, all this would show is that he was not shielding Raja. If so, who was he shielding? And, if nobody, why did he not act? There are things said about CJI Balakrishnan that may not bear repetition. But, his term as CJI is not regarded with enthusiastic commendation. He did not have to wait for Gokhale to act. Nor, indeed, did Gokhale have to wait for Justice Balakrishnan to act.

Judges

It took a PIL to ignite the controversy to effect the suspension of the gobetween lawyer. By this time, the justices have moved on. Reghupathi has retired. Gokhale has become a judge in the Supreme Court. But he thought it fit to make a ‘ holier- than- thou’ press release against Balakrishnan who, in turn had retired as CJI to hold the post- retirement job of heading the NHRC. Everyone is saved precipitous embarrassment though there are calls for Balakrishnan’s resignation from the NHRC. But there is no point denying that the reputations of former Chief Justices Gokhale and Balakrishnan are affected.

Neither discharged their duty. In the Bhattacharya case ( 1995), Justice K. Ramaswami declared that judicial misdeeds could only be cured by complaints to High Court CJs and the CJI. These incidents have made that plea hollow. The judicial record in protecting judicial probity has been embarrassing. As far as the facts are concerned, the situation is aptly described by the poet Tom Gunn: “ Youknow- I- know- you know- I know- you- knew.” The judiciary cannot be trusted to cleanse itself without an objective process that does not depend on the personality of individual Chief Justices. A proper process of appointments and complaints machinery is necessary. In this controversy, the law minister has sided with CJI Balakrishnan. We hope his Bill to create a new machinery to discipline the judiciary and make it accountable for judicial corruption is not half- hearted!

The writer is a Supreme Court lawyer

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DID EX CJI BALAKRISHNAN PROTECT RAJA

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STATEMENT BY MR. JUSTICE K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CHAIRPERSON, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA.

15th December, 2010

In the wake of reporting in some sections of media recently, it appears that an attempt is being made to create a wedge between the high institutions of judiciary and attach motives over the allegations of a union Minister having spoken to a judge to influence his judicial function, which is unfortunate. I am issuing this statement only with the hope that the facts will not be twisted and henceforth no motives will be attached to the judiciary.

I have seen the Press Release by Justice H.L. Gokhale, Judge of the Supreme Court of India. I have not said that the judge had sent an incorrect or false report to me regarding the alleged incident or suppressed any facts. I only stated that in the report given to me, no mention was made of any Minister having spoken to the judge of the Madras High Court. In the report also no name of any Minister was mentioned.

From the media reports subsequent to the press release by Justice Gokhale, it appears that I suppressed certain facts to save somebody. I never wanted to publish any confidential letter received by me in my capacity as Chief Justice of India. But as the contents of the letter by the Chief Justice of India to the Chief Justice of Madras High Court, and also the letters written by the Chief Justice of Madras High Court to CJI have already been made public through that Press Release, with much reluctance I am constrained to quote from my personal file, the full text of the report dated 08th August, 2009, given by the then Chief Justice of Madras High Court to me so that the matter be clarified.

Quote :

“Respected My Lord,

I have received your Lordship’s letter dated 8th August 2009 forwarding a copy of the memorandum by a number of Members of the Parliament to the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India. It is concerning the alleged statement made by Mr. Justice R. Reghupathi in open Court, and Your Lordship has asked me to give my views/comments relating to the issue raised in the said memorandum. The first paragraph of the memorandum states that the controversy arose when a Chennai High Court Judge made a statement in the open Court that a Union Minister had telephoned him in a matter concerning a mark sheet forgery case with the recommendation that the accused should be given bail. This statement is contrary to what the Hon’ble Judge has stated in paragraph 3 of his letter dated 2nd July 2009 which I have forwarded to Your Lordship as permitted by the learned Judge. As per that letter the learned Judge has not made any such statement in the Court. In that paragraph the learned Judge has narrated the background to explain what he has stated in the Court, and thereafter he has stated “I observed that a counsel, who made an attempt to exert influence on the Court by using the name of a cabinet Minister, cannot be allowed to succeed in snatching an order in his favour by advancing threat”. The learned Judge has, thereafter, removed the matter from his Court.

2. The second paragraph of the Memorandum states as follows:
“According to reports, the Judge has subsequently ‘clarified’ that the Minister had not spoken to him directly but that the lawyer appearing in the case on behalf of the accused had come to his chamber and informed him that the Union Minister would like to speak to him and even dialed the number to facilitate the conversation.”

The second paragraph of the letter of Honourable Mr. Justice Reghupathi clarifies the fact in this behalf, viz, that the Minister had not spoken to him although the advocate wanted him to talk to the Minister, and the learned Judge had not entertained the request.

3. Thereafter, paragraph 3 of the memorandum states that ‘assuming this clarification to be correct, it is still an attempt to interfere in the judicial process by the said Minister. If, on the other hand, the lawyer was bluffing, it calls for the most severe action against him”. This paragraph records certain questions which according to the memorandum arise out of this incident. Now, as can be seen from the letter of the learned Judge, he has clearly stated that the Minister did not speak to him. However, as far as the Advocate is concerned, the learned Judge has, in clear terms, stated that the Advocate did try to exert pressure on him. With respect to the conduct of the said advocate, two writ petitions are pending before another Bench of this High Court. A writ petition filed in Public Interest dated 2nd July 2009 seeking action against the Minister has been dismissed on 20.07.2009 as not pressed.

This is for Your Lordship’s consideration,

With kind regards,”

Unquote

I am certain that in the report received from the Chief Justice of Madras High Court, no name of the Union Minister was mentioned, and that there was no case that any minister himself made telephonic talk with the Judge or threatened or influenced him. Hence, no action could have been taken based on that report of the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court.

I maintain that I did not receive any letter from Justice Reghupathi addressed to me, and it is not the practice also to have correspondence with the judges, but always seek report from the concerned Chief Justice of the High Court, in case any issue brought to the notice of the CJI warrants so, which I did in this case. In matters of this nature, the Chief Justice of India can only go by the conclusive report of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, and that alone could be relied and acted upon. And in this issue, as per the report of the Chief Justice Madras High Court, there was no cogent ground made out for a case against any Union Minister.

I would reiterate that in any case if the concerned Judge felt that anybody, be it a Union Minister, tried to influence his judicial function, he could have proceeded against him, without seeking any direction from the CJI or the Chief Justice of High Court, under the contempt of the Court. In fact, the case on a Writ Petition against the concerned advocate in the Madras High Court is based on that ground only, which resulted in his suspension from the Bar Council of Madras and Pondicherry and the matter is still sub-judice.

All these matters were brought to the notice of the Union Law Minister on the 18th August, 2009, in response to his letter to me drawing reference to the memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister by the MPs of different political parties. There was no question of suppressing the report of the Chief Justice of Madras High Court.

New Delhi, December 8th, 2010

In some sections of media a news story is being run alleging that Justice R. Reghupathi of the Madras High Court had written a letter to me while I was the Chief Justice of India alleging that the then Union Minister, Shri A. Raja had tried to influence him and that I suppressed that letter. Thereby, casting aspersion on me that I had committed dereliction of duty. I regret to say that the allegations are absolutely incorrect. I had not received any such letter or communication from Justice Reghupathi while I was in office. When this incident was reported in the media, I sought for a report from the then Chief Justice of Madras High Court, Justice Gokhale and he sent me a report wherein nothing was mentioned about any Union Minister having made a telephonic talk with Justice Reghupathi to influence him. Therefore, there was no occasion for me to talk to the Prime Minister or to take any further action. I had disclosed these facts at the relevant time. Moreover, if anything happened like that which amounted to interference in the judicial function of Justice Reghupathi, he himself could have exercised his powers of contempt of court for which no permission is required from the Chief Justice of India. It appears that Justice Reghupathi made a statement that he reported the matter to the Chief Justice and he certainly meant the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and not the Chief Justice of India. These facts may be verified. The letter which was written by the then Chief Justice of Madras High Court Justice Gokhale to the then Chief Justice of India, wherein there was no mention of the name of any Union Minister, may be available in the office of the present Chief Justice of India.

Letter sent to former CJI had mention of Raja: Supreme Court Judge

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In an embarrassment to former Chief Justice of India K. G. Balakrishnan, Supreme Court Judge H. L. Gokhale on Tuesday contradicted his claim that he was not aware that it was former Union Telecom Minister A. Raja, who had tried to influence a Madras High Court judge in a criminal case. In a statement, Justice Gokhale, who was the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court at that time, said that in his letter to Justice Balakrishnan, the then CJI, he had clearly referred to the name of Mr. Raja.

Justice Gokhale’s statement totally contradicts Justice Balakrishnan’s claim that there was no mention of any Union Minister in the report sent by Justice Gokhale, then High Court Chief Justice, on Justice S. Reghupathi episode. “I regret to say that the allegations are absolutely incorrect,” Mr. Balakrishan had said last week referring to news reports that he had suppressed a letter purportedly written by Justice Reghupathi to him when he was the Chief Justice of India.

In a statement on Tuesday, Justice Gokhale said, “The former CJI has stated in his press conference that in my letter I did not mention the name of any Union Minister having talked to Justice Reghupathi over phone to influence him. “With respect to this statement I may point out that Justice Reghupathi’s letter was already with him and in the second paragraph thereof justice Reghupathi had specifically mentioned the name of Raja.

“I had no personal knowledge about the incident and observations in my reply wherein are in conformity with the contents of Justice Reghupathi’s,” Justice Gokhale said.

News reports had alleged that Mr. Balakrishan had suppressed that letter which had purportedly alleged that Mr. Raja had tried to influence Justice Reghupathi which cast aspersion on him (CJI) that he had committed dereliction of duty. “When this incident was reported in the media, I sought for a report from the then Chief Justice of Madras High Court Justice Gokhale and he sent me a report wherein nothing was mentioned about any Union Minister having made a telephonic talk with Justice Reghupathi to influence him,” Mr. Balakrishan had said

The truth should come out. What did the Chief Justice of India do when a High Court Judge was threatened by a Minister?

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Balakrishnan: I did not receive any letter from Regupathi when I was CJI

FROM THE HINDU

“Such reports cast aspersions on me, that I had committed dereliction of duty”

NEW DELHI: National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) chairman K.G. Balakrishnan on Wednesday denied reports in a section of the media that the former Madras High Court Judge, Justice R. Reghupathi, had written to him when he was the Chief Justice of India (CJI) alleging that the former Union Telecom Minister, A. Raja, had tried to influence him. Justice Balakrishnan also denied that he had suppressed that letter.

“Incorrect”

“Such reports cast aspersions on me, that I had committed dereliction of duty… The allegations are absolutely incorrect,” he said in a statement here. Justice Balakrishnan made it clear that he had not received any such letter or communication directly from Justice Reghupathi while he was in office.

Gokhale’s report sought

When the media reported the incident, at that time Justice Balakrishnan sought a report from the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, H.L. Gokhale, and the latter sent him a report wherein nothing was mentioned about the name of any Union Minister having talked over phone with Justice Reghupathi to influence him. “Therefore, there was no occasion for me to talk to the Prime Minister or to take any further action.”

‘Facts disclosed’

Justice Balakrishnan said he had disclosed these facts at the relevant time. “Moreover, if anything happened like that, which amounted to interference in the judicial function of Justice Reghupathi, he himself could have exercised his powers of contempt of court for which no permission is required from the CJI.”

‘Facts can be verified’

“It appeared that Justice Reghupathi made a statement that he reported the matter to the Chief Justice and he certainly meant the [then] Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and not the CJI,” Justice Balakrishnan said, adding that these facts may be verified.

The letter, which was written to him by Justice Gokhale, might be available in the office of the present Chief Justice, Justice Balakrishnan said.

Regupathi says he did mark a copy to CJI

Mohamed Imranullah S.IN THE HINDU

MADURAI: The former Madras High Court judge, R. Regupathi, on Wednesday said that he had written a letter on July 2, 2009 to the then Chief Justice of the High Court, regarding the attempt to influence him in an anticipatory bail case, with a “specific endorsement to forward the copy to the [then] Chief Justice of India” (CJI) K.G. Balakrishnan.

Speaking to The Hindu on the phone, Justice Regupathi said he did not make sure whether the letter reached the CJI or not because “if I had followed it up closely, people would have attributed motives against me. In fact, I avoided meeting the CJI after that even though he had come to the judicial academy in Chennai and I too visited the Supreme Court to meet my lawyer friends.”

He gave two reasons for not initiating suo motu contempt proceedings against the individuals concerned. “Firstly, the issue was so big and the person involved was the Chairman of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu. If I had initiated contempt, then I would have been holding my own brief. At times, judges may also commit mistakes. So I was careful in not dealing with the issue myself. Secondly, I thought it appropriate that some other judge should hear the matter. Therefore, I passed a judicial order requesting the Chief Justice of the High Court to transfer the case to another Bench. Coupled with it, I also addressed a letter to him on the administrative side. Being a sensitive issue, I was very careful and I am still sure I made the right decision,” he said.

“Once a judge delivers a judgment, he becomes ‘ functus officio’ [having performed his office]. Therefore, I made my decision that the matter should be handled my some other judge and put down everything in writing to the head of the institution and left the matter at that. “Having been a criminal lawyer for nearly 30 years, I know that this was the right way to deal with such issues,” he added.

http://www.hindu.com/2010/12/09/stories/2010120955981400.htm

Counsel cannot be allowed to succeed in snatching an order in his favour by advancing threat, says Judge

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LETTER PUBLISHED IN THE HINDU

CHENNAI: This is the letter dated July 2, 2009 written by R. Regupathi, the then Judge of the Madras High Court, to the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court containing the relevant part where there is a specific reference to R.K. Chandramohan.

“On 12.06.2009, at about 2 p.m. during Lunch Recess, while I was in the Chamber, High Court, Madras, my Office Assistant, Mr. Mujibur Ali, informed me that Mr. Chandramohan, Chairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, is waiting and seeking for an appointment to meet me and, immediately, I allowed him to come in. To start with, he discussed about the general subject on Advocates and so proceeding, he said that two persons, who are father and son/accused in a criminal case, are family friends of a Union Minister by name Raja, and that the petition filed by them for anticipatory bail must be considered favourably. Simultaneously, he handed over his mobile phone by saying that the Union Minister is on the line to have a talk with me. Right away, I discouraged such conduct of Mr. Chandramohan and told him that the case would be disposed of in accordance with law, if listed before me.

“Subsequently, on 29.06.2009, second anticipatory bail petition came to be filed for the same accused and on behalf of Mr. Chandramohan (counsel on record for the petitioners/accused), who was present in the court, Mr. Masood, Advocate, argued by stating that some new points need to be submitted and, for such purpose, the Case Diary must be summoned. Adverting to the counter filed by the prosecution and referring to the view I had already taken during the previous occasion and pointing out that there was no change of circumstance to positively consider the case of the petitioners, it was conveyed that there was no valid reason or ground to grant the prayer in the 2 {+n} {+d} petition. It was also observed that the counsel may argue the case in detail, however, this time orders would be passed on merits and they would not be allowed to withdraw the petition.

“Again, the counsel insisted that the case diary must be called for and the case be heard in detail with reference to the materials collected during the course of investigation. I have impressed upon the representing counsel by explicating that a like direction could be given to the prosecution only in the event of the Judge satisfying that such course is inevitable and absolutely necessary in a given situation and that, on mere demands and as a matter of routine, such exercise cannot be undertaken. At that time, Mr. Chandramohan stood up and made a similar demand and when I emphatically declined to accede to his adamant demand, he vociferously remarked that the court is always taking sides with the prosecution and not accepting the submissions made by the counsel for the accused while giving importance to the Prosecutor.

“On such pointless remark, I said that the counsel engaged to argue on his behalf has made his submission and he is not supposed to pass such slanderous and derogatory remarks; for, all these days, the court has been passing orders after hearing the parties and assessing the cases on their own merits and in accordance with law. In spite of that, Mr. Chandramohan insisted that the Case Diary must be summoned and the matter be adjourned to some other day. Since Mr. Chandramohan highly raised his voice and his approach towards the court was quarrelsome, I told him that a person like him, an advocate holding position as Chairman of a State Bar Council, should not behave in such a fashion. Still the learned Advocate was outburst and uncontrollable, and I observed that a counsel, who made an attempt to exert influence on the court by using the name of a Cabinet Minister, cannot be allowed to succeed in snatching an order in his favour by advancing threat. Due to such odd experience, I had to direct the Registry to place the papers before Your Lordship for obtaining orders to post the case before some other learned Judge.

“The case concerned was taken up at the end in the afternoon and inside the court hall, there were about 4 to 5 Advocates present and no one from the Press was there. That being so, the oral observations actually made came to be translated by the Print and Electronic Media with their own interpretations and ideas …….

“I have written this letter/report to apprise Your Lordship the actual state of affairs Involved.”

http://www.hindu.com/2010/12/08/stories/2010120857401400.htm